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This chapter will identify and examine the major legal issues raised by the de-
velopment and proliferation of technologies involved in assisted reproduction. It 
will review the application of existing legal principles, statutes and common law 
rules to these issues, and will illustrate the uncertainty present in the current 
legal regime in Canada. The chapter will then evaluate the need for a unified 
regulatory framework for reproductive technologies ("RTs").' While the focus 
of the chapter is an identification and review of the legal issues, it should be 
understood that these are shaped in a moral, ethical and social context. 
As noted by the Law Reform Commission of Canada ("LRC"), "[m]edically 
assisted procreation is perhaps one of the best examples of the challenges posed 
by the development of medical science and the tensions to which they give rise 
for the law."2 Distinct from many other forms of medical intervention or practice, 
RTs are often defined as "the full range of biomedical/technical interferences during the 
process of procreation whether aimed at producing a child or preventing/terminating 
pregnancy" (RD. Klein, "What's 'new' about the 'new' reproductive technologies?" in 
G. Corea et at., Man-made Women: How New Reproductive Technologies Affect Women 
(Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1987) at 64). This definition includes abortion, 
contraception, sterilization, pre-conception, and pre-natal testing and birth practices and 
techniques. For purposes of this chapter, RTs will have a muTower meaning and will include 
only those techniques and procedures that are used to produce a child. Moreover, while much 
of the literature and many of the commissions which have studied these techniques and 
practices refer to them as "new" RTs, this chapter will refer to RTs, or forms of assisted 
conception, as a way of acknowledging that one of the practices, assisted insemination, is 
indeed an old practice. 
2 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Medically Assisted Procreation (Working Paper 65) 
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1992) [hereinafter "Medically Assisted Procreation"] 
at 1. 
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the use of RTs by some can fundamentally affect the lives of all Canadians and 
their children.' Actions taken behind the traditionally closed door of the doctor- 
patient relationship involve broader consequences for all members of society.4 
Because the application of RTs is often carried out within the context of the 
physician-patient relationship, many conventional health law issues will arise. 
Among these are questions of informed consent, standards of care, confidential-
ity and the legal regulation of the practitioners performing vhrious techniques of 
medically assisted conception. In these cases, traditional sources of health law 
- including many of the common law standards and principles and statutory 
provisions discussed in this book should provide adequate means for regu- 
lating practice and resolving disputes in this area. However, because RTs have 
the potential to transform social relationships, their introduction into medical 
practice involves issues beyond the physician-patient relationship and the exist-
ing regulation of medical practice. 
RTs enable the deliberate manipulation of the processes and materials of hu-
man reproduction outside of sexual intercourse. Usually, the intention and effect 
is to produce a child. However, current innovations in reproductive biology and 
medicine also produce or isolate other reproductive materials or entities: vials of 
semen, unfertilized ova, zygotes, embryos5 - which have not existed in this 
way before. How are we to regard and treat these novel entities? Who has con-
trol over them? For what can they be used? The use of RTs, moreover, makes 
possible the creation of novel social arrangements: post-mortem insemination,' 
The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies [hereinafter "Royal Commission"] 
reported that in 1991 between approximately one and two percent of all births in Canada were 
the result of either artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization; Royal Commission, Proceed 
With Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993) [hereinafter "Proceed With Care"] at 435. 
This point is made by M. Hudson in "Societal Controls on New Reproductive Technologies: A 
Canadian Perspective" in L. Weir, ed., Governing Medically Assisted Human Reproduction: 
Report of an International Symposium (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, 
1997) 73 at 73. 
As noted by the Royal Commission, there is a problem with the terminology in this area. 
Technically, the term "zygote" refers to the fertilized egg prior to implantation. "Embryo" 
refers to the developing entity after implantation into a woman's uterus until about eight weeks 
after fertilization, when it becomes known as a fetus. However, since the term "embryo" is 
often used in public discourse in place of "zygote," we continue to use it in reference to the 
fertilized egg prior to implantation. For further discussion of this issue see: Royal Commission, 
supra, note 3 at 607. See also Bill C-47, Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Act, 
2nd Sess., 35th Parl., 1996 [hereinafter "Bill C-47], s. 2. Bill C-47 draws a distinction between 
zygotes (or pre-embryos) and embryos, where the former means a human organism in its first 
15 days of development, and the latter refers to one beginning from the 16th day to the 56th 
day. The fetus is defined by its development beginning from the 57th day to birth. In contrast, 
the Federal Government's recent draft legislation, "Proposals for legislation governing assisted 
human reproduction," [hereinafter the "draft AHRA"] defines "embryo" as a "human organism 
during the first 56 days of its development following fertilization or creation, excluding any 
time in which its development has been suspended." See Health Canada, "Proposals for 
legislation governing assisted human reproduction" (May 3, 2001). 
6 
See Parpalaix v. CECOS T.G.I. Creteil, August 1, 1984, Gazette du Palais, September 15, 1984 
Regulating Reproductive Technologies in Canada 369 
virgin births, post-menopausal pregnancy,7 multiple "parents," anonymous ge-
netic parents, and embryos conceived at one time being born at different times, 
or to different people. How are we to understand these new social arrangements 
and how should they be regulated? These and other questions focus on the ways 
in which RTs are defined and conceptualized in theory, as well as accessed and 
controlled in practice. The use of RTs has implications for kinship and thereby 
alters our understanding of the legal, social, and emotional bonds created by 
heredity and the consequences presumed to ensue from processes of intercourse, 
conception and birth. 
Typically, health law investigates the principles, statutes, and constitutional 
and policy framework that shape the allocation and delivery of health care 
services, and the relationship between the health care provider and patient. The 
World Health Organization ("WHO") defines health as a state of physical and 
mental well-being - a definition broader than that of medicine. Health is more 
than the "absence of disease" and includes the harmonious development of the 
human person.' Moreover, since human beings socially interact, whether in the 
medical sciences or the daily routines of life, health is a social construction as 
well as a biological condition; its norms are constructed in a social environment 
and include not only medical-scientific determinants but also social determinants. 
Law can be one such determinant. Since law helps to determine and regulate the 
social relations that underpin individual well-being and, by implication, individ-
ual health status, law itself becomes one of the factors which affect individual 
health. 
The emergence of RTs over the last quarter century has sparked numerous ef-
forts at regulatory reform by panels and commissions established in many juris-
dictions throughout the world. These assembled groups considered whether or 
not to establish a new reproductive order, or to find ways of containing the new 
possibilities engendered by the RTs within the old reproductive order.' While 
these forums have led to volumes of recommendations, and sometimes to regu-
lations, they have rarely led to legislation.1° 
(France). See infra, note 206 dispositional control over the deceased's sperm deposit); Hecht v. 
Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles (Kane), 20 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 275 (1993) (deceased's sperm as part of his estate distributed in light of his intentions to 
procreate after death); R. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, 
[1997] 2 All E.R. 687 (C.A.) (use of sperm taken from comatose husband without prior written 
consent as required by legislation). 
See A. Lippman, "Never Too Late': Biotechnology, Women and Reproduction" (1995) 40 
McGill L.J. 875. 
See online: World Health Organization <http://www.who.intlaboutwho/en!definition.htrril>. 
D. Roy, J. Williams & B. Dickens, Bioethics in Canada (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall 
Canada Inc., 1994) at 132. 
10 B. M. Knoppers & S. LeBris, "Ethical and Legal Concerns: Reproductive Technologies 1990-
1993" (1993) 5 Current Opinion in Obstetrics and Gynaecology 630 at 631. See, for example, 
in the United Kingdom, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37(5) (Eng.); in 
Victoria, Australia, Infertility Treatment Act (1995); in France, Loi sante, Loi justice, Loi 
recherché. 
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There are two ways to regulate RTs: one can regulate just the ends, or both the status, control and disposition of sperm, ova and embryos; embryo research; 
the means and the ends. On the one hand, it has been argued that regulation stem cell research; and human cloning. This chapter explores the constitutional, 
should focus solely on the particular ends ethically unacceptable to society," statutory and common law implications of such issues and considers a range of 
rather than widely constrain and "chill" medical science and technology. Alter- possible legal and regulatory frameworks governing the use of RTs. 
natively, a regulatory regime might account for the use of RTs as both a means 
of assisting biological processes and as an end with social and ethical implica- A. INFERTILITY 
tions. This chapter will explore the legal ramifications of pursuing either ap- 
proach to the regulation of RTs. Reproductive technologies are generally considered to be a treatment for the 
Currently, there is a legal vacuum regarding the express regulation of repro- condition of infertility. Infertility, however, can be seen as either a medical 
ductive technologies in Canada. 12 Although statutes and case law in America problem or as a social condition of childlessness. The Royal Commission states 
and other jurisdictions provide some guidance, their application as persuasive that "[d]efining infertility as a socially generated problem implies that we 
forces in the Canadian context remains questionable. should look to social solutions."" Discussion of infertility involves particular 
There have been efforts to fill this vacuum. In Canada, the dominant ten- language and definitions chosen by medical practitioners, legislators, and other 
dency has been to regulate reproductive technologies as medical practice and to interested parties language that can be medical and/or social .14 
apply existing legislation and common law principles to their regulation. The The use of RTs traditionally presupposes the medical model of infertility. In 
increasing use of RTs, however, has heightened calls for comprehensive regula- the medical model, physicians and other health care practitioners identify and 
tion by interested citizens and practitioners who seek clear guidance from evaluate the condition of infertility, and then make choices about the appropriate 
statutory law. Several proposals for legal reform have been put forward by a use of RTs. Many critics and commentators have questioned the appropriateness 
number of formal commissions, most significantly, the Royal Commission on of the medical model. We will now consider alternative models and illustrate the 
in which the definition of infertility shapes the legal regulation of RTs .15 ways New Reproductive Technologies ("Royal Commission"). At the time of writing, 
however, these efforts have yet to result in the enactment of comprehensive According to most medical definitions, infertility is the inability to produce a 
legislation. Bill C-47, the first attempt to regulate reproductive technologies in child despite regular unprotected intercourse over a certain period of time dur- 
Canada, died on the order paper when Parliament dissolved on April 27, 1997, ing a woman's fertile period. According to Bernard Dickens, in an oft-quoted 
just prior to a federal election. More recently the federal Minister of Health has passage: 
asked the Standing Committee on Health to review draft legislation regulating 
assisted reproduction and to report back by the end of January 2002. While this 
draft legislation has no legal effect (at the time of writing), it illustrates how the 
federal government has recently approached regulatory concerns regarding RTs. 13 Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 173. The common assumption is that the need and desire 
In this chapter, we will draw upon Bill C-47 and the new draft legislation to to have children is a normal part of our lives. 
describe past and present regulatory attempts, and to illustrate possible forms of 
14 Several courts have found that employees' decisions to undergo in vitro fertilization treatment 
regulation regarding the use of RTs in Canada. for infertility are reasonable and that the employees should be compensated for time off due to 
This chapter begins by canvassing the basic definitions of infertility, taking 
sickness or disability under the respective collective bargaining regimes. See, for example: 
Metropolitan General Hosp. and O.N.A., Re (1987), 32 L.A.C. (3d) 10 (Ont.); Canadian Union 
into account both the biological factors and social norms that colour the stipula- of Postal Workers and Canada Post Corp. CUPW (744-95-00073), [1999] C.L.A.D. No. 81; 
tion of infertility as a medical condition. We then describe the RTs used in the O.P.S.E. U. v. Ontario (Ministry of Health), [1989] O.J. 2434 (QL) (Gen. Div.); Hamilton Civic 
treatment of infertility. The chapter briefly reviews a range of existing and pro- Hospitals and O.N.A., Re (1988), 32 L.A.C. (3d) 284 (Ont.). 
posed legal mechanisms with which to regulate RTs and goes on to raise a num- 15 See Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 172-75. See also S. Franklin, "Deconstructing 
ber of legal issues arising from the introduction of RTs in medical practice. 'Desperateness' The Social Construction of Infertility in Popular Representations on New 
These issues include: access to RTs; informed consent; the legal rules governing Reproductive Technologies" in M. McNeil, I. Varcoe & S. Yearley, eds. The New Reproductive 
Technologies (New York: St. Martins Press, 1990) at 200. See also T. Balakrishnan & 
R. Fernando, "Infertility Among Canadians: An Analysis of Data from the Canadian Fertility 
Survey (1984) and General Social Survey (1990)" in Royal Commission, The Prevalence of 
" B. Dickens, "Do Not Criminalize New Reproductive Technologies" (March 1996) Policy Infertility in Canada, vol. 6 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, Canada, 1993). 
12 
Options 11. Infertility has also been categorized as perceived or inferred infertility, where the former refers 
For a discussion of possible regulatory approaches in Canada see: P. Healy, "Statutory to the woman's "subjective" perception of infertility, and the latter to an "objective" inference 
Prohibitions and the Regulation of New Reproductive Technologies under Federal Law in of infertility according to basic criteria. "Aggregate infertility" is said to be a combination of 
Canada" (1995) 40 McGill L.J. 905; Hudson, supra, note 4; A. Harvison Young & perceived and inferred infertility; T.R. Balakrishnan & P. Maxim, "Infertility, Sterlization, and 
A. Wasunna, "Wrestling With the Limits of Law: Regulating New Reproductive Technologies" Contraceptive Use in Ontario" in Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 
(1998) 6 Health L.J. 239; M.A. McTeer, Tough Choices: Living and Dying in the 21st Century Research Vol. 6: The Prevalence of Infertility in Canada (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 1999). Services, 1993) 163-90 at 165-66. 
372 Canadian Health Law and Policy Regulating Reproductive Technologies in Canada 373 
Infertility includes infecundity, meaning inability to conceive or to impregnate, causes are sexually transmitted diseases, smoking, and age 25  When people wait 
and pregnancy wastage, meaning failure to carry a pregnancy to term through longer before attempting to reproduce, they face lower chances of success due to 
spontaneous abortion and stillbirth. Infertility includes primary infertility, where a 'biological aging and the increased exposure to risk factors over time.26 Infertile 
couple has never achieved conception, and secondary infertility, where at least one individuals may also wait longer than those who are fertile before seeing a phy- 
16 conception has occurred but the couple is currently unable to achieve pregnancy. sician. Other possible causes of biological infertility include environmental 
In Canada, infertility is typically defined as failure to conceive within one year 
toxins, workplace hazards, diet, alcohol, caffeine, illicit drugs, disease, medical 
of regular unprotected sexual intercourse.  17  The WHO, however, stipulates a 
procedures with unintended effects,27 sterilization, and contraception.28 
time period of two years." At least some medical practitioners treat infertility In addition to being seen as a medical problem, infertility can also be seen as 
negatively as a "malfunctioning" of the human system over a period of time, a social condition deviating from a social norm. The social norm involves the 
and thus as a "disease."9  In Canada, three formal commissions have enunciated model of a nuclear family, consisting of married heterosexual parents and their 
three different definitions of "infertility" which span the spectrum of the mcdi- biologically related children. Under this model, infertility deviates from the 
cal and the social. The Ontario Law Reform Commission ("OLRC") defined 
"ideal family." This model generates strong social pressure to satisfy the norm 
infertility in terms of couples who "have attempted, but failed, to produce a for couples to procreate. The basic assumption is that the need and desire to 
have children is a normal part of our lives.29 child and do not respond to conventional therapy."20  The OLRC's definition is 
limited to medical criteria, and does not include "personal choices that bear no The stigma of childlessness is especially difficult for women, who have his- 
relation to the issue of medical need. ,21 Similarly, the LRC defined infertility as torically been defined and identified through their roles as mothers.3° The 
"the involuntary, significant reduction of reproductive capacity," as based on the "treatment" "disease" of women for the condition or of infertility must therefore 
"inability to become pregnant after one year of unprotected intercourse. "22 On 
be viewed in this gender-specific context. RTs generate stresses and problems 
the other hand, the Royal Commission simply defined the "prevalence of infer- when "infertile" women feel pressured to use them, and continue to do so, cycle 
tility" over one year: "The absence of pregnancy in a couple who have been 
cohabiting for at least the past year and who have not used contraception during 
that period."23  The Royal Commission elaborated an account addressing "the 25 Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 172. 
physiological and sociological aspects of infertility. "24 The three definitions of 26 Ibid., at 190-91, 255, 261-62; OLRC, vol. 1, supra, note 20 at 12-13. It is well known that age 
infertility above contain a variety of social and medical factors. The recommen- affects the fertility of females much more than males. 
dations by each formal commission, and thus possible regulatory regimes, seem 27   There are several reported tort cases that have awarded plaintiffs compensation to pay for 1VF 
to vary according to the definitions of infertility. (Note that these medical defi- treatments in cases of medical negligence causing infertility. See, for example: Berezowski- 
nitions of infertility typically assume that infertility is something that affects Aitken v. McGregor, [1998] M.J. No. 180 (QL) (Q.B.) (the court awarded $50,000 for IVF 
heterosexual couples: we will discuss this further below.) treatments to the female plaintiff as compensation for infertility due to medical negligence); 
Infertility is caused by, or at least associated with, several medical (or bio- 
Lanthier-Rochon v. Sim, [1996] O.J. No. 4449 (QL) (Gen. Div.) (Chadwick J. awarded $15,000 
logical), environmental and social factors. The more common physiological 
for IVF treatments in the case of the negligent performance of a What ligation). However, in 
Bains v. Green, [1997] B.C.J. No. 943 (QL) (S.C.), Fisher 1. declined to award damages for the 
cost of IVF and ICSI to a young, single man with a spinal cord injury as a result of a motor 
vehicle accident, stating "I find the future both as to time and relationship very indefinite 
regarding fertilization, and as well the likelihood of its non-success amount to speculation that 
16 
B. Dickens, "Reproduction Law and Medical Consent" (1985) 35 U.T.L.J. 255 at 281. 
17 
each procedure would occur." In addition, courts have held that plaintiffs are not required to 
use RTs in order to reasonably mitigate damages for the loss of reproductive capacity or 
Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 183. 
18 fertility. See, for example: Adan v. Davis, [1998] O.J. No. 3030 (QL) (Gen. Div.); Kelly v. 
19 
Ibid. 
Ibid., at 172. 
Lundgard, [2001] A.J. No. 906 (QL) (C.A.). For discussion of 1W and ICSI, see B. Reproductive 
20 
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related 
Technologies in the next section of this chapter. 
25 
Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 199-338. See LRC, supra, note 2 at 15-17. See also 
Matters. vol. 1 (Toronto: Ministry of Attorney General, 1985) at 9. Conventional therapy for males OLRC, supra, note 20 at 10-14. 
and females varies and may include infertility counselling, hormones, and surgery (at 14-15). 29 It has been argued that the "need" and "desire" for children conflate social and biological 2
22 
t 
Ibid., at 10. 
LRC, supra, note 2 at 14. 
explanations of infertility; S. Franklin, "Deconstructing 'Desperateness': The Social 
23 
Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 186. The Royal Commission also considered a two-year 
Construction of Infertility in Popular Representations on New Reproductive Technologies," 
supra, note 15. See also K. Alpern, "Genetic Puzzles and Stork Stories: On the Meaning and 
definition, substituting into the quoted version, "for at least the past two years." The Royal Significance of Having Children" in K. Alpern, ed., The Ethics of Reproductive Technology 
Commission, however, failed to address the definition and issue of contraception, nor did it (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 147. 
account for lesbian and single women not cohabiting with a male partner. 
24 
30 See N. Pfeffer, "Artificial Insemination, In Vitro Fertilization, and the Stigma of Infertility" in 
Ibid., at 173. The Royal Commission assumed that physiological dimensions can be, at times, M. Stanworth, ed., Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine 
entirely separated from sociological dimensions. (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 1987) at 81. 
31 
For example, see "Baby Sparks Dispute" The Globe and Mail (12 January 1995). See also 
A. Lippman, "Never Too Late': Biotechnology, Women and Reproduction" (1995) 40 McGill 
L.J. 875. 
32 
See, for example, Cameron v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 611 
(N.S.C.A.), affg (1999), 172 N.S.R. (2d) 227 (S.C.), leave to appeal dismissed (without 
reasons), [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 531 (June 29, 2000), reconsideration of leave to appeal 
dismissed (November 15, 2001). In this case the female partner requested IVF treatment 
together with her husband's use of ICSI as a treatment for his "severe male factor infertility." 
Both parties claimed discrimination under Charter s. 15 on the grounds that infertility 
constituted a "disability." The majority of the Court of Appeal recognized that the exclusion of 
ICSI and IVF from the public health insurance plan amounted to discrimination on the basis of 
disability or on analogous grounds. They found, however, that the exclusion from coverage 
under the public health insurance plan was saved under s. 1 of the Charter. 
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infertility among men is 50-100 per cent of the incidence among women. 33 
Nonetheless, men's infertility is much less researched and understood than 
women' s.34  Another example of how infertility is a social and gendered phe-
nomenon: although infertility is generally thought to be on the rise, this may, in 
part, stem from the large number of women who delay having children to estab-
lish their careers. It is therefore appropriate to consider infertility a condition 
that is due to a combipation of social and medical (or biological) factors. 
The infertile are said to have three options: treatment by RTs, adoption, or 
"live with it." These options must be viewed in their social context, particularly 
in light of the prevailing perceptions and attitudes towards "family" relations .35 
The adoption and "live with it" options have not yet alleviated public concerns. 
Public adoption, as reported in 1993, involves an average six-year wait due to a 
shortage of babies to be adopted.36 The process is long and complex, and re-
mains difficult for single women and men. Widespread acceptance of the "live 
with it" option would require a notable shift in Canadian norms. The lack of 
adoption opportunities and the basic social unacceptability of the "live with it" 
option have contributed to the increasing demand for RTs and their regulation. 
The demand for RTs is high partly because the alternatives are difficult and/or 
undesirable. 
In addition to treatment, another policy response to infertility is prevention. 
The Royal Commission recommended that priority be given to prevention of 
infertility rather than focussing solely on its treatment. 17 The federal govern-
ment's 1996 White Paper proposed to address the condition of infertility by 
stressing "infertility prevention, social solutions and, lastly, infertility interven-
tions that are appropriate, safe, and effective."38 Such proposals, if implemented, 
would require the re-allocation of resources among lines of prevention and 
treatment within the health care system. 
33 A report conducted for the Royal Commission found that male infertility occurred in one-
quarter of couples who sought treatment at a fertility clinic; supra, note 3 at 167. The OLRC 
reports that "[t]here appears to be general agreement that the causes of infertility are distributed 
evenly among male factors, female factors, and a combination of both male and female 
factors"; OLRC, supra, note 20 at 11. See also another study reported by the OLRC indicating 
marked differences similar to those found by the Royal Commission; supra, note 3, at note 6. It 
should be noted, however, that empirical studies on infertility, in light of the social 
stigmatization attached to their reporting, fall under a shroud of mystery. The lack of data, 
moreover, seems to benefit the status quo, focusing on women's infertility rather than men's. 
Furthermore, such studies may exclude those who deliberately choose, for genetic or other 
reasons, not to attempt conception. 
34 Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 167. 
35 The Royal Commission contended that, at times, the biological and sociological aspects of 
reproduction are intertwined; ibid., at 169. See also J. Dolgin, "Choice, Tradition, and the New 
Genetics: The Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family" (Winter 2000) 32 Conn. L. Rev. 523. 
36 Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 370. See also the OLRC, supra, note 20 at 15-17. 
37 Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 177. 
38 Health Canada New Reproductive Technologies: Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health 
(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 19. 
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after cycle, even when treatment repeatedly fails. This pressure can have signifi-
cant economic, physiological and psychological costs. Women who choose to 
pay to reproduce (in surrogacy contracts) may be stigmatized as "deviant" - or 
even criminal under some proposed legislative models. The commercialization 
of procreation is viewed as problematic in light of societal norms; the basic as-
sumption is that human reproduction is usually outside the market realm. 
But let us return to the medical definitions of infertility to'  make an important 
point: many people who are not medically infertile may nonetheless still be can-
didates for RTs. This category includes people without partners of the opposite 
sex, such as lesbian couples and single women who wish to procreate without 
the involvement of a male partner. This category also includes women who wish 
to have a child without becoming pregnant. Moreover, individuals and couples 
who carry genetic conditions may wish to avoid natural procreation in order to 
avoid passing these conditions on to their child. These cases challenge the as-
sumption that RTs are merely treatments for the medical condition of infertility. 
Under many medical definitions infertility is regarded as affecting couples 
thus reinforcing the idea that RTs should be available only to socially recog-
nized unions This obscures the fact that single individuals may be concerned 
about their reproductive health status and may seek to use RTs even before 
wishing to reproduce. Where infertility is reported only as a percentage of the 
adult population of childbearing age, teens and post-menopausal women (who 
have now gained access to RTs in some countries)" who are infertile will be 
excluded Furthermore as noted earlier,  single women may wish to procreate 
without a partner. These and numerous other considerations illustrate how social 
values and policy preferences have circumscribed the biological definitions of 
infertility and, implicitly, the pool of candidates for RTs. The medically infertile 
couple has maintained dominance as a privileged form of social relationship. 
Infertility is not purely a medical (or biological) phenomenon it is also social 
and gendered. Most reproductive technologies focus on women as the problem-
atic part of the couple. Women can be the subjects of treatment even when the 
male partner is medically (or biologically) infertile Sometimes fertile women 
undergo invasive procedures such as in vitro fertilization for the treatment of 
their infertile husbands 32  Yet empirical evidence indicates that the incidence of 
376 Canadian Health Law and Policy 
We will now consider the challenges of RTs and their regulation as a primary 
treatment for infertility, providing new opportunities for reproduction by infer-
tile individuals and couples. 
B. REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
Several reproductive technologies exist for treatment of infertility,  namely,  do-
nor or non donor artificial insemination in vitro fertilization ( IVF  ) and related 
technologies and embryo manipulation and research Artificial insemination is 
the oldest and most basic reproductive technique and may occur by hus-
band/partner ( AJH  ) or by donor ( AID  ) 
4° It involves the artificial (or thera-
peutic) placement of sperm into the vagina, cervix, uterus, or fallopian tube at 
the appropriate time. The placement coincides with ovulation so as to increase 
the chances of conception. As a relatively inexpensive and non-invasive proce-
dure, artificial insemination has been a popular first choice for the treatment of 
biological and social infertility. However,  where infertility is due to the absence 
or blockage of a woman's fallopian tubes (i.e., if the egg cannot pass through 
the fallopian tubes to be fertilized and implanted in the uterus) or in cases of 
male factor infertility,  another reproductive technique is required 
In vitro fertilization has rapidly developed since its introduction in the late 
1970s,  and has brought with it many new possibilities for assisted reproduc 
tion 41  In vitro fertilization basically involves the retrieval of a woman's' eggs 
from her ovaries and the fertilization of those eggs (in a glass petri dish or in 
vitro) outside her body and their re implantation either into her womb or that of 
another woman 42  The in vitro process usually involves the creation of many 
embryos and the selection of a few for implantation the remaining embryos 
may be destroyed frozen for later use donated to other women or couples or 
used for research In vitro fertilization is much more onerous than artificial in-
semination. The monitoring of ovulation, the inducement of superovulation, and 
the retrieval of a woman's eggs are invasive with attendant medical risks and 
side effects.43  
Assisted reproduction may also involve related technologies such as gamete 
intra-fallopian transfer ("GIFT") and intracytoplasmic sperm injection ("ICSI"). 
In treatment of male factor infertility, in vitro fertilization may be combined 
39 
For a more detailed discussion, see LRC, supra, note 2 at 22-76; Royal Commission, supra, 
note 3 at 425-659. 
40 
 Artificial insemination is also called therapeutic insemination by husband/partner ( ATH  ) or 
by donor ("AID"). In practice, the semen by the husband/partner may be mixed with that of the 
donor to increase the likelihood of conception. The Royal Commission concludes that this 
practice is not considered good practice as it generates ambiguity over parentage (supra, note 3 
41 
at 439).  
C.L. Meyer, The Wandering Uterus: Politics and the Reproductive Rights of Women (New 
York: New York University Press, 1997). 
42 
For a more detailed description, see LRC, supra, note 2 at 22-50. 
4° 
The side effects of superovulation, for example, can include hot flushes, abdominal discomfort, 
blurred vision, and ovarian cysts. See D.L. Steinberg, Bodies in Glass: Genetics, Eugenics, 
Embryo Ethics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) at 34-35. 
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with the micromanipulation techniques of sperm injection and egg manipulation 
(i.e., zona cutting or drilling for easier sperm penetration). ICSI, which involves 
the careful selection and injection of a single sperm into an egg, is now a widely 
accepted procedure for the treatment of severe male factor infertility.4° GIFT is a 
procedure which places sperm and eggs directly into the fallopian tube.45 It is 
combined with superovulation, a preliminary process that produces additional 
eggs for placement back into the fallopian tube to increase the possibility of 
conception. The fertilization itself is said to occur naturally. The GIFT process, 
however, does not assist women with fallopian tube blockage. 
Embryos may also be genetically screened or even manipulated prior to im-
plantation. For example, it may be possible to manipulate an embryo to produce 
one containing the same genetic information as a living or deceased human be-
ing; to alter its genetic structure so that such alteration may be transmitted to a 
subsequent generation to clone human embryos; or to create animal-human hy-
brids.4° These modified embryos may be implanted into a woman and even 
brought to term. Moreover, in vitro fertilization and genetic testing may be used 
to screen and genetically alter embryos for particular genetic conditions and 
traits. This practice of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis is likely to become 
more common with the increased development of genetic testing if coupled with 
societal acceptance of genetic selection of offspring. 
So far, we have described the RTs commonly used in Canada. These have 
been developed in line with medically accepted definitions of infertility and are 
evolving continually. As illustrated above, however, any effective regulatory 
framework will have to contend with the controversy surrounding the estab-
lishment of a generally agreed-upon definition of infertility, and by implication, 
who may be eligible for what forms of medical treatment. In the absence of such 
social consensus, any suggested regulatory framework would need to be flexible 
to account for differing outlooks on the definition, prevention and treatment of 
infertility. 
C. REGULATING REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN CANADA 
The regulation of RTs in Canada currently involves statutes, case law, the Con-
stitution Act, 1982, and professional ethical guidelines. In this section we will 
canvass existing legislation concerning the transfer and storage of human tis-
sues, as well as the constitutional constraints imposed on the regulation of RTs 
by the division of powers and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms4° 
("Charter"). In addition, we will review two recent Canadian proposals to 
regulate RTs in Canada: Bill C-47 and the draft AHRA. 
4° ICSI, when combined with epididymal sperm aspiration - making it possible to retrieve sperm 
from the epididymis or the testicles - creates new reproductive opportunities for men with low 
sperm counts (Toronto Centre for Advanced Reproductive Technology, Newsletter, 1996). 
4° 
See LRC, supra, note 2 at 50-53. 
4° See Bill C-47 (2nd Sess., 35th Parl.), s. 4; draft AFIRA, s. 3. 
4° Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter "Constitution Act"]. 
48 
Part I of the Constitution Act, ibid. 
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The legal regulation of RTs may be broadly classified under the categories of 
public and private law. The former involves statutory regulation by govern-
ments while the latter involves judicial resolution of disputes among private 
parties at common law. Private ordering may be challenged under human rights 
legislation, whereas public regulation may, in addition, face review under the 
Constitution Act. Some would argue that human reproduction and associated 
• medical research properly belong to the private sphere kind should not be re-
stricted by public regulation unless there are exceptionally compelling reasons. 
These voices effectively propose a free market for RTs, using liberal arguments 
against government intrusion. In this argument, medical laboratories are analo-
gous to bedrooms as sites of human reproduction. It is further argued that gov-
ernment regulation would produce a "chilling" effect on medical research and 
development of RTs. Others, however, reply that private ordering shelters actual 
or potential unethical medical research and practice from public scrutiny. 
In Canada, comprehensive legislation has yet to be enacted addressing the le-
gal issues raised by RTs .49  Moreover, there has been limited case law and com-
mon law guidance in this area. In the absence of express law, RTs may be 
implicated in a number of ways, for example, under the heads of human tissue 
legislation, property law, contracts, torts, criminal law, the regulation of profes-
sions, and constitutional law. In the absence of existing legislation and case law 
• directly applicable to RTs, these areas of law become relevant to the regulation 
of RTs. 
II. LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW 
A. EXISTING LEGISLATION 
Although the federal and provincial governments have not yet committed them-
selves to a comprehensive response to the Royal Commission's recommenda-
tions, some relevant legislation has been enacted. Under regulations of the Food 
and Drugs Act,5°  which became enforceable June 1, 1996, the federal govern- 
49 
For discussion of RTs in other jurisdictions see, E. Bernat, "Towards a New Legal Regulation 
of Medically Assisted Reproduction: The Austrian Approach" (1992) 11 Medicine and Law 
547; B. Knoppers & E. Sloss, "Recent Developments: Legislative Reforms in Reproductive 
Technology" (1986) 18 Ottawa L. Rev. 663; Royal Commission, supra, note 3; LRC, supra, 
note 2; L. Jonsson, "Regulation of Reproductive Technologies in Sweden" in L. Weir, ed., 
Governing Medically Assisted Human Reproduction: Report of an International Symposium 
(Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, 1997) at 87; L. Waller, "Australian 
Legislation on Infertility Treatments" in L. Weir, ed., Governing Medically Assisted Human 
Reproduction: Report of an International Symposium (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 
University of Toronto, 1997) at 91; J. Woodside, "The Role and Function of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority: Legislation, Regulation and Consultation" in L. Weir, 
ed., Governing Medically Assisted Human Reproduction: Report of an International 
50 
Symposium (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, 1997) at 97. 
Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27. 
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ment controls the processing, testing and distribution of semen for donor in-
semination under the definition of "drug."" In the absence of compulsory pro-
fessional guidelines across Canada, the Processing and Distribution of Semen 
Regulations were intended to establish uniform national standards to decrease 
the risk of infectious disease transmission, and therefore reduce the costs to pro-
vincial health care systems.52 These regulations require that a "processor or im-
porter" quarantine semen for at least six months to test for HIV and various 
other sexually transmitted diseases.53 Where a physician who had performed 
assisted conception has reasonable grounds to believe that an infectious agent 
was transmitted through the semen, then he or she must quarantine the semen, 
inform the persons to whom the semen was distributed, destroy or quarantine 
the remaining semen, inform the donors about the results of investigation, and 
submit a final report.54 The Excise Tax Act" also contains provisions relating to 
the importation of human sperm .16 
In Quebec, the Public Health Protection Act57  regulates "gametes or embryo 
conservation centres," which is defined as "premises outside a facility main-
tained by an institution operating a hospital centre, designed for the collection, 
conservation or distribution of human gametes or embryos with a view to using 
the gametes or embryos for medical or scientific purposes." This Act gives the 
Director the authority to "coordinate the measures for the protection of public 
health and the distribution and supervision of the services relating to such pro- 
51 . Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, SORJ96-254 
("Processing and Distribution of Semen Regulations"), as amended, under the Food and Drugs 
Act, ibid. See also Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, C. Gaz. 1996.11.1718. The 
Regulations also follow the Guidelines for Therapeutic Donor Insemination, published by the 
Department of Health, Ottawa (July 2000); see s. 1. Sections 5 to 8 allow for the importation of 
tested semen, if additional processing criteria are met, including written notice to the Director. 
In addition, the Regulations require specific procedures for the distribution of semen for 
assisted conception be undertaken pertaining to screening, laboratory controls, labelling, 
records, and tracing of semen; ss. 9-18. Recent amendments to the Regulations now provide 
physicians with an alternative to obtaining semen under the usual processing guidelines, supra. 
Physicians may obtain "special access" authorization by fulfilling specific criteria, including a 
written rationale for the request, assurances that no reasonable grounds exist to believe there is 
a serious risk of transmitting an infectious agent, and that the patient has been informed of the 
risks to the patient and to the child to be conceived; see s. 19. 
52 
53 
Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, supra, note 51 at 1719, 1721. 
Ibid., s. 4. (1)(b). 
54 
Ibid., ss. 14-15. 
55 R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15. 
56 Various acts to amend the Excise Tax Act, ibid., have described human sperm using the 
language of property: Goods and Services Tax Act, S.C. 1990, c. 45, s. 180(1) and Excise Tax 
Act, S.C. 1993, c. 27, s. 180(2), address the importation of human sperm; R.S.C. 1985, E-15, 
Sch. VI, "Zero-Rated Supplies," Part I, s. 5 considers "a supply of human sperm" under the 
heading of prescription drugs and biologicals deemed "zero-rated supplies" for purposes of 
57 
G.S.T. application. 
Public Health Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-35, s. 1 (the cited definition is not yet in force). 
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tection," including the assurance of public access to services, the collection of 
medical information, and the issuance of permits for medical services.58 
In addition, Quebec, Newfoundland, and the Yukon, under family law have 
regulated the use of donor sperm.59  These provinces have legislated the pre-
sumption that the male partner of a woman inseminated with donor sperm is 
deemed the father of the child if he consented to the donor insemination. Que-
bec is the only province to have regulated procreation &nd gestation agree-
ments.6°  It deems procreation or gestation agreements made on behalf of another 
person as "absolutely null."61 In Quebec, the gestational mother is deemed to be 
the mother for legal purposes.62  The province also provides that a child born 
from medically-assisted procreation may apply to a court to have health-related 
information about his or her genetic parents transferred to the medical authori-
ties, where the deprivation of this information would cause serious injury to the 
child's health or the health of close relatives.63 
All provinces have legislation regulating the exchange of human tissues, os-
tensibly for the purpose of organ transplantation. The legislation in most prov-
inces involves the same definition for human tissue: "includes an organ, but 
does not include any skin, bone, blood, blood constituent or other tissue that is 
replaceable by natural processes of repair."TM A few provinces and territories 
have not explicitly defined "tissue .,,6' The question of whether or not human 
tissue includes gametes and embryos is left to the courts in these jurisdictions. 
One might argue that gametes are genetically unique and "replaceable by natural 
processes of repair," like blood. On the other hand, while embryos are geneti-
cally unique, they are not exactly replaceable. 
In response to this legislative uncertainty, the provinces of Ontario, Manitoba 
and Prince Edward Island amended the human tissue legislation to expressly 
exclude gametes and embryos. Ontario, for example, now defines human tissue 
58 
Ibid., s. 2. 
59 
See Children's Act, R.S.Y.T. 1986, c. 22,s. 13; arts. 538-542 Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, 
c. 64 [hereinafter C.C.Q.]; Children's Law Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. C-13, s. 12. 
60 
An analysis of the legal implications of gestational agreements is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
61 
Art. 541 C.C.Q. 
62 
See art. 53 C.C.Q. 
63 
64 
Art. 542 C.C.Q. 
For example, see Human Tissue GiftAct, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-iS, s. 1(e); Human Tissue Gift Act, 
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 211,s. 1; Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 89, S. 1; Human Tissue Gift 
Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 215, s. 2(c); Human Tissue Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. H-IS, s. 2(c); Human 
Tissue Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-12, s. 8(1), as am.; Human Tissue Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. H-iS, 
s. 2. But see also art. 19 C.C.Q., which states that a person may "... alienate a part of his [sic] 
body only if that part is capable of regeneration and provided that no serious risk to his [sic] 
health results." Article 25 of the Civil Code of Quebec requires that '[t]he alienation by a 
person of a part or product of his body shall be gratuitous; it may not be repeated if it involves 
a risk to his [sic] health." 
65 
See Human Tissue Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. H-6. Nunavut has adopted the Northwest 
Territories legislation. Similarly, the Civil Code of Quebec does not define "body parts"; see 
arts. 11-25 C.C.Q. 
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as: "a part of a living or dead human body and includes an organ but, unless 
otherwise prescribed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council, does not include 
bone marrow, spermatozoa, an ovum, an embryo, a foetus, blood or blood con-
stituents."66 The legislative amendments by Ontario, Manitoba and Prince Ed-
ward Island arguably increase the likelihood that courts in provinces without 
clear definitions of "human tissue" will include gametes and embryos. We will 
further discuss human tissue legislation later in this chapter. 
I sJ si ii. cei i pu u lxi 
In response to growing public concerns, the Government of Canada appointed 
the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies in October 1989.67 
The mandate empowered the Royal Commission to examine: "[the] implications 
of new reproductive technologies for women's reproductive health and well-
being," "the causes, treatment and prevention of male and female infertility," 
various reproductive and related technologies, "social and legal arrangements, 
the status and rights of people using or contributing to reproductive services," 
and "the economic ramifications of these technologies .,,6' The Royal Commis-
sion set forth an "ethic of care" framework and a guiding set of eight ethical 
principles for decision-making: "individual autonomy, equality, respect for hu-
man life and dignity, protection of the vulnerable, non-commercialization of 
reproduction, appropriate use of resources, accountability, and balancing of in-
dividual and collective interests."69 In doing so, the Royal Commission pro-
moted "mutual care and connectedness" between individuals, families and 
communities .70 The Royal Commission further elaborated, "[t]he  ethic of care 
means that a large part of ethical deliberation is concerned with how to build 
relationships and prevent conflict, rather than being concerned only with re-
solving conflicts that have already occurred." The interests of individuals and 
communities thus may be considered interdependent.71  
Under an "ethic of care" framework, the Royal Commission analyzed much 
empirical evidence and formalized its position on the regulation of new repro-
ductive and genetic technologies in Canada. In November 1993, the Royal 
Commission made public 293 recommendations, concluding: "decisive, timely, 
and comprehensive national action is required with respect to the regulation of 
new reproductive technologies."72 In particular, the Royal Commission called 
66 
Trillium Gift of Life Network Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 20, s. 1, as am. Manitoba and P.E.I. have 
also explicitly excluded spermatozoa, ova, embryos, blood, and blood constituents: Human 
Tissue Gift Act, S.M. 1987-88, c. 39, s. 1; Human Tissue Donation Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. H- 
67 
12. 1, s. 1. The Manitoba provision also excludes placenta from the definition of "tissue." 
The Royal Commission was established under Part I of the Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I- 11, 
with a mandate by Order in Council Nos. P.C. 1989-2150 (October 1989) and P.C. 1991-524 
(March 1991). 
69 
68 Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 3. 
Ibid., at 53. 
70 
Ibid., at 50. 
71 
Ibid., at 52. 
72 
Ibid., at 107. 
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for legislation to set clear boundaries around acceptable and non-acceptable uses 
of new reproductive and genetic technologies and to regulate and monitor the 
use of acceptable practices and developments in this field. To achieve this goal, 
the Royal Commission stated that the federal government should use its power 
under the Criminal Code  73  to prohibit practices that "because of their unsafe or 
unethical character [are] considered unacceptable under any circumstances."74 In 
addition, the Royal Commission recommended the establishment of a national 
regulatory commission charged with the responsibility of setting and enforcing 
standards for those practices deemed acceptable. The major functions of this 
proposed national commission were to be: "licensing and monitoring; guideline 
and standard setting; information collection, evaluation, and dissemination; rec-
ords storage; consultation, coordination, and intergovernmental cooperation; 
and monitoring of future technologies and practices."" 
In July 1995, the federal Minister of Health, the Honourable Diane Marleau, 
called for an interim moratorium on specific applications of new reproductive 
and genetic technologies, and announced the appointment of an advisory com-
mittee to monitor compliance with the moratorium.76 In June 1996, the federal 
government introduced Bill C-47, An Act Respecting Human Reproductive 
Technologies and Commercial Transactions Relating to Human Reproduction 
(in short, The Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Act), providing 
for criminal sanctions for the most serious acts including those named in the 
moratorium. The Bill would have prohibited "practices that commercialize re-
production or are inconsistent with the principles of human dignity, including 
the buying and selling of eggs and sperm, sex selection for non-medical reasons, 
and commercial surrogacy."77 In addition, Bill C-47 included in the list of pro-
hibited activities: implanting animal embryos into humans or vice versa; fusing 
human and animal zygotes or embryos; maintaining human embryos outside the 
human body (beyond the 14-day limit); germ-line alterations; manipulating ova 
or embryos; fertilizing animals with human sperm, or vice versa; retrieving the 
ovum or sperm from a fetus or cadaver with the intention of maturing, fertilizing 
or implanting the ovum in a woman or outside the human body; or causing the 
fertilization of an ovum outside the human body for purposes of research. Sanc-
tions for engaging in prohibited activities ranged from significant fines to im-
prisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years. 
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Bill C-47 received a range of responses, including much criticism of the gov-
ernment's use of criminal prohibitions .7' The Canadian Bar Association 
("CBA") strongly criticized the use of absolute criminal prohibitions for failing 
to balance "individual autonomy" and "the dangers inherent in the use of the 
technology. ,79  They also discussed concerns about the possible "chilling effect" 
on research and clinical practice. The CBA supported policy guidelines that 
would allocate a determinative role to the professions in self-regulation and to 
patient autonomy. While supporting scientific freedom, the CBA criticized sev-
eral provisions of Bill C-47 for their "highly scientific" and "inaccessible" lan-
guage and expressed a general concern over the "complexity, over-breadth and 
lack of precision" of the legislation, particularly given the absolute criminal 
prohibitions. Bill C-47 was also criticized for its lack of focus and unenforce-
ability.80 According to another commentator, a regulatory framework seems 
preferable to the use of criminal law sanctions, which may create an under-
ground market for human reproduction.81 A regulatory framework might better 
support women's reproductive autonomy, while avoiding problems in reaching 
a public consensus, the unavailability of donors, and the potential exploitation of 
women within an underground market.82 
At the same time as the introduction of Bill C-47, the federal government 
published a White Paper, entitled New Reproductive Technologies: Setting 
Boundaries, Enhancing Health" promising to establish a regulatory body and 
framework within which the regulation of acceptable practices would take place. 
A two-step enactment process was proposed for legislation that would eventu-
ally combine prohibitions (under Bill C-47) and regulatory controls to provide 
for "a comprehensive management regime for new reproductive and genetic 
technologies." Any such regime would promote a multidisciplinary approach, 
and would be established under an agency removed from central government.85 
The proposed regime would centre on the issuance of licences for various new 
reproductive and genetic technologies and related practices, and the establish-
ment of appropriate standards by a range of enforcement mechanisms, as well as 
information registries and health surveillance procedures. Due to the various 
pressures of an upcoming federal election, the proposed regime failed to materi-
alize, and Bill C-47 died on the order paper. 
73 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
74 
Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 108. 
75 
Ibid., at 115-16. 
76 
Health Canada, News Release 1996-44 (Ottawa, 14 June 1996). See J. Woodard "Policy 
Experimentation in a Petri Dish" (14 August, 1995) 10:30 Western Report 36. See also Health 
Canada, New Reproductive Technologies: Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health (Ottawa: 
Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 24-26. Marleau's narrow response may have been 
directly related to the Royal Commission's position against a general moratorium; see Royal 
Commission, ibid., at 15. 
77 
Health Canada, News Release 1996-44, supra, note 76; Bill C-47, Human Reproductive and 
Genetic Technologies Act, 2nd Sess., 35th Part., 1996, ss. 3-7. 
78 See the Canadian Bar Association, "Submission on Bill C-47" [on file with authors]; 
A. Harvison Young, "Brief Prepared for the Standing Committee on Health on Bill C-47; 
P. Healy, "Statutory Prohibitions and the Regulation of New Reproductive Technologies Under 
Federal Law" (1995) 40 McGill L.J. 905. 




Healy, supra, note 78. 
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Harvison Young, supra, note 78. The Supreme Court of Canada decision of R. v. Morgentaler, 
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, has often been cited for constitutional support of a woman's reproductive 
83 
autonomy in the context of abortion. 
84 
See New Reproductive Technologies: Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health, supra, note 76. 
Ibid., at 27. 
85 
Ibid.  
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In May 2001, Allan Rock, the federal Minister of Health, took the unusual 
step of presenting new draft legislation entitled "Proposals for Legislation Gov-
erning Assisted Human Reproduction before the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Health. He instructed the Conmiittee to review the draft legisla-
tion and report on it by the end of January 2002.86 The draft legislation com-
bines the criminal prohibitions in Bill C-47 with the regulatory framework 
outlined in the 1996 White Paper. Therefore, the draft legisfation includes both 
prohibited activities, which carry criminal sanctions, and controlled activities, 
which are regulated through the issuance of licences. 
The draft AHRA, like Bill C-47, contains a preamble that sets out a number 
of guiding principles and considerations that inform the Act, and guides law-
makers in interpreting and implementing the legislation. Included in this list are: 
recognition of the need to "protect and promote the best interests of children"; 
recognition that "women more than men are directly and significantly affected 
by" the application of RTs; a commitment to the principle of "free and informed 
consent in the use of RTs a recognition of the health and ethical concerns 
inherent in the trade in the reproductive capacities of women and men and in 
their exploitation and that of children for commercial ends and a recognition of 
the "importance of preserving and protecting human individuality and the integ-
rity of the human genome A number of these principles were stated in Bill C-
47 as well However,  there is a significant shift in the attitude towards repro-
ductive and genetic technologies expressed in the two pieces of draft legislation 
Whereas the preamble of Bill C-47 began with an expression of grave concern 
about the significant threat to human dignity,  the risks to human health and 
safety, both known and unknown, and other serious social and ethical issues 
posed by certain reproductive and genetic technologies," the preamble of the 
draft AHRA begins with an acknowledgment of the benefits to individuals and 
to society in general of assisted human reproductive technologies and believes 
that those benefits can be most effectively secured by taking appropriate meas-
ures for the protection and promotion of human health, safety, dignity and rights 
in the use of such technologies." Another difference between Bill C-47 and the 
draft AHRA is that the former contained a set of legislative objec 
tives 57Although the draft AHRA is silent about the objectives of the legislation 
information published by Health Canada at the time the draft legislation was 
introduced states that it has two primary objectives: first, to "ensure that Canadi-
ans using assisted human reproduction techniques do so without compromising 
their health and safety," and second, to "ensure that promising research involv-
ing human reproductive materials takes place within a regulated environment. ,88 
86 
The common procedure would have been to introduce a bill in the House of Commons rather 
than instructing a Standing. Committee to review draft legislation. 
87 
The objectives set out in Bill C-47, s. 3 were: the protection of "health and safety of Canadians 
in the use of human reproductive materials"; ensuring the appropriate treatment of ex utero 
human reproductive materials "in recognition of their potential to form human life," and 
protection of the "dignity of all persons, in particular children and women, in relation to uses of 
human reproductive materials." 
8 
Health Canada, News Release, "Rock launches review of draft legislation on assisted human 
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This second purpose, while not overtly expressed in the text of the draft legisla-
tion, appears to inform many of the activities designated as controlled. 
As stated earlier, the draft AHRA identifies both prohibited and controlled 
activities. Those activities prohibited under the draft legislation are very similar 
to those prohibited under Bill C-47 and include: human cloning by embryo 
separation and somatic cell nuclear transfer; germ-line genetic alteration; the 
development of an embryo outside a woman's body beyond the accepted 14-day 
limit; the creation of embryos solely for research; creating an embryo from an-
other embryo or fetus; transplanting reproductive material from animals into 
humans; the use of human reproductive material previously transplanted into an 
animal; the sale and purchase of human embryos; sex selection (except for rea-
sons relating to the health of the resulting human being); the purchase, barter or 
exchange of sperm or ova; and commercial surrogacy arrangements. In addition, 
the draft AHRA contains specific provisions prohibiting the use of gametes ob-
tained from a minor and prohibiting the counseling or inducement of a minor to 
become a surrogate.89  The prohibition against human cloning and provisions 
related to minors are the only new items to be added to this list. Anyone con-
victed on indictment of a prohibition may face a fine of up to $500,000, or a jail 
term of no more than 10 years, or both. Summary convictions may result in a 
fine of up to $250,000, or a jail term of no more than 4 years, or both. 
In addition to setting out a range of prohibited practices, the draft AHRA also 
lists controlled activities permitted only if carried out under license and in ac-
cordance with the regulations of the draft AHRA. The controlled activities set 
out in the draft AHRA include: altering, manipulating or treating human repro-
ductive material for the purpose of creating an embryo or facilitating human 
reproduction; using an in vitro embryo, or part of one for research or the pre-
vention, diagnosis or treatment of a disease, injury or disability; exporting, 
storing or handling gametes or embryos for reproductive or research purposes; 
the creation of a chimera; combining any part of the human genome with that of 
an animal species; and reimbursing the donor of gametes, in vitro embryos, hu-
man cells or genes for expenses incurred in the course of donating, or reim- 
bursing a surrogate mother for her expenses incurred in relation to her 
pregnancy. The classes of controlled activities are not fixed, however, as the 
Governor in Council may make regulations "designating classes of controlled 
activities that may be authorized by a license issued under subsection 12(1)" of 
the draft AHRA.9° 
The draft legislation recognizes the significance of health information, both 
as a privacy issue and as an important societal resource for the promotion of 
health. To this end, the draft AHRA mandates the maintenance of a personal 
reproduction to ban cloning and regulate related research" (3 May 2001), online: 
<http://www.hc-sc/gc.calenglishlmedialreleases/2001/2001 
 — 
44e.htm>. See also: Health Canada 
"Assisted Human Reproduction - Frequently asked Questions" (May 2001), online: 
89 
<http://www.hcsc/gc.caIenglish/media1releases/2001/200l_44ebk3.htm>. 
See ss. 4(5) and 7(1) and (2) of the draft AHRA. 
90 Ibid., s. 40(1)(a). This section also refers to "classes of controlled activities that may not be 
authorized." 
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health information registry91 and a public health registry.92 The draft AHRA 
seeks to restrict personal nominative information and endeavours as far as pos-
sible to keep the use of such information at the discretion of donors and persons 
conceived through RTs.93 It also mandates the collection of health information 
for purposes of public health and makes that information available for public 
health purposes and accessible to the descendants of donors Y' The draft legisla-
tion further mandates access to the information used to evalhate and adjudicate 
applications for a licence.95 The exact nature of the information to be disclosed 
for the purposes of public health is subject to regulations, the details of which 
are not specified in the draft legislation. 
The draft AHRA empowers the Minister of Health with broad discretion to 
regulate the proposed controlled activities.96 The main regulatory instrument 
specified in the draft legislation with respect to these activities is the issuing of 
licences under the discretion of the Minister of Health. This proposed licensing 
regime does not distinguish between clinical reproductive uses and research uses 
of reproductive materials but rather includes them in the same regulatory 
framework. The language of the statutory provisions outlining the Minister's 
authority to administer the regulatory regime is permissive rather than directive 
("the Minister may" rather than "the Minister shall")97 and includes the power 
to: amend or revoke the terms and conditions of a licence at any time,98 amend 
or suspend a licence,99 and renew a licence.'00 
In general, the draft AHRA proposes control over a broad range of activities 
pursuant to regulations under the Governor in Council. These regulations are not 
specified in the legislation, but the promotional literature from Health Canada 
that accompanied the introduction of the draft AHRA suggests that the regula-
tions will set out: counselling requirements for donors and recipients; safety 
requirements of laboratories; how human gametes and embryos are to be han-
dled and stored; limitations on the number of embryos that can be transplanted 
during IVF; and requirements for informed consent. 101 However, only one of the 
subjects listed is specifically mentioned in s. 40(1), the section empowering the 
Governor in Council to make regulations to implement the Act. 
Following the recommendations of the Royal Commission, it was broadly 
anticipated that a specialized body would be established to oversee and regulate 
the practice and use of reproductive and genetic technologies. However, the 
91 
mid., s. 21(2). 
92 
Ibid., s. 22. 
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Ibid., s. 19. 
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Ibid., s. 20. 
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Ibid., s. 22. 
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Ibid., s. 12. 
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See, for example, ss. 12, 13, 14, 16, 17,21 and 23. 
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Ibid., s. 13. 
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Ibid., s. 14. 
100 
Ibid., s. 13. 
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Health Canada, "Proposals for legislation governing assisted human reproduction: Executive 
summary" (May 2001), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.calenglish/medialreleases/2001/2001  
44ebk1.htm>. 
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draft legislation says only that the Minister of Health may "take into account 
information and observations offered by any person and may seek the advice of 
persons having expertise" when considering an application for a licence. The 
draft legislation neither mandates nor empowers the establishment of a special-
ized expert commission to implement and administer the regulatory regime.102 In 
the absence of any specialized body mandated by this draft legislation, only the 
bureaucracy of Health Canada can administer the licensing policy. In a puzzling 
discrepancy, a document released by Health Canada to accompany the draft 
AHRA envisages the establishment of a regulatory body, either within Health 
Canada or at arm's length to it, responsible for the implementation of the pro-
posed legislation.'°3  The document identifies four functions to be carried out by 
that body: licensing and enforcement, health information, policy development, 
and communications. It further suggests that the composition of the regulatory 
body will be "broadly representative of all parties interested in assisted human 
reproduction."  °4  By contrast, the draft legislation itself mandates only the des-
ignation of inspectors by the Minister to enforce the regulatory scheme.105 Fur-
thermore, the draft AHRA recognizes the concurrent nature of federal 
jurisdiction of the subjects regulated under the draft legislation by empowering 
the Governor in Council to suspend its regulations by agreement with a province 
where equivalent regulations and prohibitions exist. 106 
C. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
Prior to legislative drafting, governments must consider constitutional dimen-
sions. RTs must be regulated according to the division of powers of the Consti-
tution Act, 1867,107 and must also meet the guarantees under the Charter. 
1. Division of Powers 
Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 set forth the division of powers 
between the federal and provincial governments. Section 91 distributes legislative 
102 Section 15(1) of the draft AHRA. 
103 Health Canada, "Proposals for Legislation Governing Assisted Human Reproduction: An Overview" 
104 
(May 2001) at 9, online: <http://www.hcsc.gc.caIenglishIPdf/repr0ductio11IrePro_opth'> 
Ibid., at 10. 
105 Section 23 of the draft AHRA. 
106 Ibid., s. 41(1). See also the final report on the draft AHRA: House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Health, "Assisted Human Reproduction: Building Families" (December 2001). 
Among its 36 recommendations, the Standing Committee stated that: the enactment of new 
legislation should be a priority; embryos should be used for research only if no other biological 
materials are available; payments to gamete donors and surrogates should be prohibited; donors 
of gametes and embryos should consent to the release of identifying information; the federal 
and provincial governments should enter into agreements ensuring uniform standards and 
enforcement; a regulatory body should be created semi-independent to and outside of the 
Department of Health; and the Patent Act should he amended to prohibit the patenting of 
human materials. 
107 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3. 
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jurisdiction to the federal government as a matter of "national interest and con-
cern" under the criminal law [s. 91(27)], trade and commerce [s. 91(2)], taxation 
[s. 91(3)], federal spending (as inferred from various sections), and treaty pow-
ers (as inferred), as well as the residual category of peace, order and good gov 
ernment'°' Under s. 92, the provinces have legislative jurisdiction for matters of 
property and civil rights [s. 92(13)], hospitals [s. 92(7)], and the residual cate-
gory of matters of a merely local or private nature in the province [s. 92(16)]. 
The courts have generally recognized that Parliament or the provincial legisla-
tures have jurisdiction over a specific area if it falls in "pith and substance" un-
der an enumerated category. However, the constitutionality of federal or 
provincial legislation is not undermined where the legislation has an incidental 
effect on other enumerated categories. As well, the courts have recognized that a 
matter may have a "double aspect" in that it falls under provincial jurisdiction 
for one purpose, and federal jurisdiction for another purpose.'09 
It has been argued that the very fact the federal government initiated the 
Royal Commission is evidence enough to pull it under federal jurisdiction as a 
"national concern."0  Parliament may also find the power to regulate RTs under 
other areas, including criminal law, trade and commerce, taxing, federal spend-
ing, and treaty powers. Parliament could possibly regulate reproductive tech- 
nologies under the Canada Health However, even if the federal 
government can regulate RTs under one or more of these categories, the prov-
inces may nonetheless regulate incidental effects under, for example, their pow-
ers over hospitals and health plans. 
The federal and provincial governments have not yet formally addressed is-
sues of standardization and uniformity for the definition and treatment of infer-
tility, access criteria, and funding of RTs. It remains to be seen in which ways 
mutual co-operation will be required of federal and provincial governments, in 
light of the Constitution Act, 1867. A regulatory framework at the federal level 
may best address not only rapidly changing RTs and social norms, but also 
changing tensions in federal-provincial relations. It seems, nevertheless, that 
many unfolding issues concerning the regulation and effects of RTs, and par-
ticularly the uncertainty in the use and disposition of human "materials," are 
best a matter for legislatures (as a more representative body) and not the elite 
institutions of courts. 
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The Charter guarantees rights and freedoms except where the government can 
show reasonable and demonstrable justification in a free and democratic society. 
The Charter applies only to government conduct and legislation (and inaction); 
it does not directly concern private activities ."2 The governmental regulation of 
RTs may face Charter scrutiny under various sections, particularly s. 7 (the right 
to life, liberty and security of the person) and s. 15 (equality). There are a num-
ber of issues involving the use of RTs which are likely to require Charter analy-
sis, including: the "right" to biological parenthood through the use of and access 
to RTs, and whether or not the rights and interests of surrogate mothers, gamete 
donors, embryos and fetuses may be recognized under the Charter. In the ab-
sence of Canadian jurisprudence, some limited guidance may be gathered from 
American and other foreign jurisprudence on similar constitutional issues. We 
will address Charter issues, specifically the issue of access through a right to 
biological parenthood, and the issue of the legal status of gametes and embryos, 
as they arise in subsequent sections in this chapter. 
I). HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION 
While the Charter applies only to government action or inaction, human rights 
legislation applies to both public and private sector activities, including those of 
individuals and corporations."' Most human rights codes in Canada recognize 
that individuals shall not be discriminated against on the basis of "race, national 
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, 
family status, disability and conviction for which a pardon has been granted." 
Section 3(2) of the Canadian Human Rights Act further states: "Where the 
ground of discrimination is pregnancy or child-birth, the discrimination shall be 
deemed to be on the ground of sex." Although similar in substance, the provin-
cial human rights codes for each Canadian province contain nuances based on 
varying language that may warrant further analytical attention. The Ontario 
Code, for example, states: "Every person has a right to equal treatment with 
respect to services, goods and facilities, without discrimination because of race, 
ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual 
orientation, age, marital status, same-sex partnership status, family status or dis-
ability."4 The Quebec Charter, on the other hand, more broadly states: "Every 
105 
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Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Overview of Legal Issues in New 
Reproductive Technologies, vol. 3 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1993) 
[hereinafter, "Regulation of NRTs] 1; M. Jackman, "Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Health in 
Canada" (2000) 8 Health L.J. 95; M.A. McTeer, Tough Choices: Living and Dying in the 21st 
Century (Toronto: Irwin Law, 1999). 
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For an interesting and detailed discussion, see Jackman, "The Constitution and the Regulation 
of New Reproductive Technologies," supra, note 108. 
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Ibid., at 5. 
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R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6. 
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See Eldridge v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (equality of rights for disabled's 
access to sign language interpreters as covered under a publicly funded scheme and where the 
Medical Services Commission has discretion over the expenditure and thus provision of 
medical care servicesunder such scheme). 
113 
See, for example, the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 3, as am.; Human 
Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 1; Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-
12, s. 10; Human Rights, Citizenship, and Multiculturalism Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-14, S. 7; 
Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, s. 7(1). 
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Ontario Human Rights Code, supra, note 113, s. 1. The B.C. Human Rights Code includes 
"race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental 
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Because RTs are used in both clinical and research contexts, guidelines and 
policies exist regarding their use in both of these contexts. A statement of pro-
fessional guidelines for embryo research can be found in the Tr-Council Policy 
Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans ("Tr-Council Pol-
icy Statement"), which was drafted on behalf of the three federal funding agen-
cies in 1998.118 This document sets out ethical guidelines that must be satisfied 
before research is eligible for government funding. '9  In addition to case law and 
legislation, professional guidelines play an important role in the regulation of 
the use of RTs in the clinical and research contexts. We will discuss the Tr-
Council Policy Statement and the Joint Policy Statement of Medical Profession-
als in more detail throughout the remainder of this chapter. 
UI Ui (Sil 1 (SI U (A IiSJ DII 151: M U U ai 
A. ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
Most individuals seek access to RTs because they wish to have a child and are 
either unable or unwilling to do so through sexual intercourse. Not all individu-
als who want to use RTs will be able to do so. Access to reproductive technolo-
gies may be limited by a number of considerations, such as formal or informal 
medical criteria and the high cost of treatment. In some circumstances, decisions 
about access to RTs will be made by physicians who screen applicants accord-
ing to criteria established by private infertility clinics or set out in professional 
guidelines. Provincial health insurance legislation may also restrict access by not 
insuring certain forms of RTs under provincial health care insurance plans.12° 
Furthermore, legislatures may also specify who may have access to RTs and in 
what circumstances. Where individuals encounter such barriers that limit their 
access to RTs, the barriers may be challenged under the Charter and/or provin-
cial human rights codes. We will now focus on a few of the more likely Charter 
challenges under ss. 7 and 15 and their relevance to the regulation of RTs. 
To access RTs, individuals or couples usually approach a physician in a pri-
vate fertility clinic or public hospital. Clinics and hospitals use a variety of crite-
ria to determine access to RTs. First, the clinic or hospital determines whether 
the individual or couple would benefit overall from such assistance. The criteria 
typically centre on the potential benefits and risks to the health and safety of 
participants based on various medical factors, including the condition of infer- 
118 Tr-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (Ottawa: Public 
Works and Government Services Canada, August 1998). 
119 The Tr-Council Policy Statement was created by the Medical Research Council of Canada, the 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Natural Sciences and 
Engineering Research Council of Canada. See also the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, 
Human Plunipotent Stem Cell Research: Guidelines for CIHR-Funded Research (4 March 
2002), online: <http://www.cihr.ca/about_cihr/ethics/Stem_ce1115tem_ceh1_guidd1e5_e5html> 
(date accessed: 23 April 2002). 
120 See, for example, the Ontario Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 11.6. 
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person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his [sic] human 
rights and freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, 
colour, sex, pregnancy, sexual orientation, civil status, age except as provided 
by law, religion, political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, social 
condition, a handicap or the use of any means to palliate a handicap .'15" In the 
context of RTs, it is likely that human rights legislation will be most commonly 
invoked by those wishing to use assisted procreation but who are denied access 
on the basis of one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination. We will discuss 
the case law concerning human rights legislation as part of the section on access 
to reproductive technologies later in this chapter. 
E. COMMON LAW 
In the absence of comprehensive legislation regulating RTs, the courts have 
resolved disputes by resorting to existing common law rules and principles. 
While the jurisprudence regarding RTs remains relatively undeveloped in Can-
ada, there are several cases that have considered issues related to RTs in the 
areas of family, contract, employment and tort law. These cases include issues 
related to the standards for medical practice concerning RTs, the status and 
quality of sperm donation, determinations of paternity where AID has been 
used, access to RTs, and the assessment and measure of damages. We will refer 
to these cases throughout the remainder of this chapter. 
F. PROFESSIONAL GUIDELINES AND POLICIES 
Medical professionals whose practice involves the use of RTs must satisfy the 
formal requirements of professional regulation in their area of practice, and fol-
low the practice guidelines established by their respective regulatory bodies.116 
Several societies and associations have created ethical guidelines for medical 
professionals concerned with assisted reproduction. The Society of Obstetricians 
and Gynaecologists of Canada ("SOGC") and the Canadian Fertility and An-
drology Society ("CFAS") have produced a joint policy statement on ethical 
issues to guide the conduct of medical professionals practising in the area of 
assisted reproduction.  117  This document includes policy statements on access to 
RTs, informed consent, commercial preconception agreements, embryo re-
search, and the use and transfer of gametes and embryos. 
Alberta Human Rights Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act [Alberta Human Rights Code], in 
contrast, encompasses "race, religious beliefs, colour, gender, physical disability, mental 
disability, age, ancestry, place of origin, , marital status, source of income or family status of 
that person or class of persons." See also Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, which read into 
the Alberta Human Rights Code protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
115 
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tility and the participants' age. Some physicians have also adopted other, non-
medical criteria to limit access to in vitro fertilization, including a woman's or 
couple's ability to parent. Factors some practitioners consider relevant to suc- 
cessful parenting include: psychological immaturity; below-average intelli-
gence; physical disability; other children living with the prospective parents; 
low income; and place of residence. Other criteria relate to the couple's or indi-
vidual's marital status, the presence of a partner, and sexual orientation.121 Indi-
viduals and couples may also face discriminatory barriers based on race and 
ethnicity. 
Cost is another barrier to RTs. Access criteria vary among clinics and across 
provinces, raising concerns not only about the uniformity of standards, but also 
about mobility barriers based on class. 122 Many individuals and couples who 
seek access to RTs depend upon health care insurance to pay for RTs, but few 
RTs are paid for under provincial health insurance schemes. In Ontario, for ex-
ample, the Ontario Health Insurance Plan ("OHIP") guidelines regulate such 
funding and thus establish access barriers. Women may access public funding 
for in vitro fertilization if they show "complete bilateral anatomical fallopian 
tube blockage. ,123  Moreover, OHIP only provides funding for up to three com-
plete cycles of in vitro fertilization, and does not fund micro-manipulation tech-
niques for the treatment of male infertility, such as intracytoplasmic sperm 
injection. This suggests that perhaps access to health care funding is shaped by 
the view that RTs are treatment of a female medical problem. 
Any regulatory framework that limits access to RTs may face challenges un-
der the Charter. The Charter may be invoked to challenge statutory provisions 
and regulations that limit access either directly on the basis of medical factors, 
or indirectly on the basis of listed services under provincial health insurance 
plans. Three clusters of constitutional arguments could be invoked in order to 
gain access to RTs. Broadly speaking, an argument for a positive "right to pro-
create" may be constructed on the basis of s. 7 rights to liberty. Alternatively, 
access to reproductive technologies could be sought using s. 7 on the grounds 
that it includes a positive right to health care and that access to RTs is an intrin-
sic component of that right. A third basis from which to challenge access to RTs 
is s. 15. Where government legislation or action provides some individuals ac-
cess to RTs but not others, it may be possible to claim discrimination where 
such access is denied to individuals who are members of an enumerated or 
analogous class under s. 15. This line of argument would claim access to RTs as 
a negative right. The categorization of positive and negative rights is important 
in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's reluctance to recognize socio-
economic rights under the Charter generally, and specifically, under s. 7. 
A Charter challenge places the onus on the parties seeking access to RTs to 
show that a right or freedom has been infringed in legislative purpose or effect. 
121 
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(A person seeking access under s. 7 of the Charter has the onus to demonstrate 
that the deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person is not in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice.) Once an infringement has been es-
tablished, the focus turns to s. 1 of the Charter where the onus shifts to the gov-
ernment to show that the legislation is reasonable and demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society. 
Section 7 of the Charter states that: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty 
and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in ac-
cordance with the principles of fundamental justice." The first analytical step is 
to determine whether life, liberty or security of the person has been deprived by 
legislation or government conduct. In light of recent trends in Canadian courts, 
the regulation of access to RTs is unlikely to fall within the right not to be de-
prived of life.'24  In other words, Canadian courts have not yet shown any interest 
in supporting a right to biological parenthood as essential to one's life. 
A more fruitful line of argument might be to establish a positive right to pro-
create under Canadian constitutional law. A 1993 Report by the LRC discusses a 
positive right to procreate and concludes: "it seems likely that either liberty or 
security of the person, or both, will be found in a future case to include the right 
to procreate."  25 The Charter does not expressly include a right to procreate. 
However, if such a right exists, it is most likely to be within the s. 7 right to lib-
erty or security of the person. 
Section 7 has been raised in a reproductive context in two cases before the 
Supreme Court of Canada: R. v. Morgentaler' 26 and E. (Mrs.) v. Eve.127 How-
ever, it is only in the former that the Court addressed substantive interests in-
volving reproductive claims. Relying on an expansive interpretation of the right 
to liberty, Wilson J. stated that the right to liberty in s. 7 of the Charter "guar-
antees to every individual a degree of personal autonomy over important deci-
sions intimately affecting their private lives."  28  With respect to the decision of 
whether to terminate a pregnancy, Wilson J. stated: 
This decision is one that will have profound psychological, economic and social 
consequences for the pregnant woman ... It is a decision that deeply reflects the 
way the woman thinks about herself and her relationship to others and to society 
124 
LRC, supra, note 2 at 152. 
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Wilson affirmed that this broad conception of liberty ought to be protected by s. 7. In Jones, the 
plaintiff argued that an Alberta legislative regime regarding educational instruction violated his 
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her dissent, Wilson J. stated at 318 that: 
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at large. It is not just a medical decision; it is a profound social and ethical one as 
well. Her response to it will be the response of the whole person. 129 
In protecting a sphere of reproductive liberty in relation to a woman's abortion 
decision, Wilson J. acknowledged that such a choice falls within the realm of 
decisions that are protected from state interference by the right to liberty. In 
articulating the conception of liberty protected by the Charter, Wilson J. relied 
upon a series of American cases that have held that the right to privacy, while 
not expressly enumerated in the American Constitution and its Amendments, is 
an aspect of the right to liberty and includes the right to procreate.  130  One could 
argue that Wilson J.'5 conception of liberty in Morgentaler supports the view 
that a general prohibition on the use of RTs would constitute an infringement of 
s: 7, as such a prohibition could infringe personal autonomy over important de-
cisions that fundamentally affect the way a woman thinks about herself and her 
relationship to others. 
In E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether a court 
had the power, pursuant to its parens patriae jurisdiction, to authorize the con-
traceptive sterilization of a mentally disabled woman and whether such a sterili-
zation would be in the woman's best interests. In concluding that courts do not 
have jurisdiction to authorize a non-consensual sterilization for non-therapeutic 
purposes, La Forest J. writing for the Court stated: 
The grave intrusion on a person's rights and the certain physical damage that en-
sues from non-therapeutic sterilization without consent, when compared to the 
highly questionable advantages that can result from it, have persuaded me that it 
can never safely be determined that such a procedure is for the benefit of that per-
son. Accordingly, the procedure should never be authorized for non-therapeutic 
purposes under the parens patriae jurisdiction. 131 
In coming to this conclusion, La Forest J. did not find it necessary to rely on the 
Charter. Therefore, whether there is a constitutionally protected right to procre-
ate has yet to be determined. However, throughout his decision, La Forest J. did 
suggest that there was a "growing legal recognition of the fundamental character 
129 
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of the right to procreate"  132 and that a non-consensual sterilization would con-
stitute a deprivation of this right. As noted by the LRC: 
Justice La Forest pointed out the "growing legal recognition of the fundamental 
character of the right to procreate," "the great privilege of giving birth," and "[t]he 
importance of maintaining the physical integrity of a human being ... particularly 
as it affects the privilege of giving life." He characterized the proposed steriliza-
tion as a "grave intrusion on a person's rights" and an "irreversible and serious 
intrusion on the basic rights of the individual." 133 
It remains to be seen whether Canadian courts will accept an interpretation of 
s. 7 that supports individual autonomy in procreation. Moreover, even if the 
courts were to find a right to procreate protected by s. 7 of the Charter, this right 
may be viewed as a negative right the right to be able to procreate without 
state interference rather than a positive right to medically assisted procrea- 
tion. 
The second Charter argument is that s. 7 should be interpreted as creating a 
positive right to basic social services, including the right to health care.  134  The 
claim is that such services are fundamental to protecting the values of life, lib-
erty and security of the person. However, even if s. 7 of the Charter is found to 
guarantee the right to health care, it is unlikely that access to RTs would be in-
cluded under the framework of protected services. Rather, it is likely that a dis-
tinction will be drawn between basic health care services which are necessary to 
sustain life and basic well-being, and those services such as RTs, whose ab-
sence, while impoverishing one's quality of life, do not threaten life itself. 
Therefore, it is not likely that the courts will interpret the Charter in a manner 
that requires legislatures to provide access to RTs. However, where govern-
ments do undertake to legislate with respect to the delivery of RTs, the Charter 
may be invoked to ensure that this is carried out in a manner consistent with S. 
15. 
Section 15 of the Charter provides a basis upon which to argue for non-
discriminatory access to reproductive technologies. Section 15(1) states that 
"[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in par-
ticular without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability."135 A law must not discrimi- 
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nate on enumerated or analogous grounds by design or by impact against par-
ticular individuals or groups. One could argue that the infertile as a group are 
discriminated against based on "physical disability." Grounds for access would 
entail arguing that this group is prevented by the state from having children de-
spite the existence of a remedy in the form of medical treatment using RTs. 
However, even if the court finds infertility to be a physical disability and that 
the infertile are discriminated against as a class, this need not result in manda-
tory access to RTs. The court may hold that alternative remedies (such as adop-
tion, for example) are available to mitigate this form of discrimination. Where 
access to RTs is available only as an uninsured medical service, there may be 
grounds to challenge the lack of publicly-insured access on the grounds of so-
cio-economic discrimination. However, since s. 15 properly applies only to ar-
eas of positive state action, it would be difficult to employ unless it could be 
found that the decision not to fund access to RTs was deliberately discrimina-
tory. 
A more promising line of argument, therefore, would be to apply s. 15 to 
those individuals and groups who are currently denied access to RTs under pro-
vincial eligibility criteria, where, for example, provinces provide and insure 
access to some but not to other couples or individuals. Access criteria that rely 
upon a particular definition of infertility may be more susceptible to challenge 
under s. 15. Where these definitions appear to rule out or exclude certain 
groups, for example, single lesbians, or lesbians in a conjugal relationship, but 
allow access to married heterosexual couples, there may be grounds for a find-
ing of discrimination. 116 The infertile may claim analogous grounds under s. 
15(1), particularly on the basis of social, political and legal disadvantage. 117 To 
the extent that infertility, by whatever cause, constitutes a disability, the state 
may be construed to have favoured the reproductive opportunities of some 
groups over others through either action or non-action. Economic arguments of 
budget constraint may not be used to systematically favour particular groups 
over others. 
Provincial authorities (and indeed hospitals) may not be protected against 
charges of discrimination under the argument that access criteria are based on 
strictly medical-scientific factors. Some argue that where access criteria for in 
vitro fertilization, for example, are based strictly on medical infertility, then dis-
crimination is unlikely to occur. 138 However, such arguments ignore the possibil-
ity that bias in these criteria may mask the subjective preferences and social 
prejudices of both those who devise such criteria as well as those medical prac-
titioners who apply them. For example, under many definitions, lesbian couples 
136 
See Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 426-38. Another issue not yet considered by the courts 
is whether or not gay men can legally access RTs, for example, by way of surrogacy 
arrangements, in hopes of creating a new form of family. 
137 
See Jackman, "The Constitution and the Regulation of New Reproductive Technologies" in 
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Overview of Legal Issues in New 
Reproductive Technologies, vol. 3 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1993) at 24-25. 138 
LRC, supra, note 2 at 196. The Royal Commission supports the separation of medical and 
social factors; supra, note 3 at 174. 
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can never be "medically infertile." In Korn v. Potter"' the British Columbia Su-
preme Court affirmed a human rights tribunal decision that a physician's refusal 
to provide artificial insemination to a lesbian couple was discriminatory on the 
basis of sexual orientation. This is consistent with the Royal Commission's rec-
ommendation that "a]ccess to in vitro fertilization treatment be determined on 
the basis of legitimate medical criteria, without discrimination on the basis of 
11 
factors such as marital status, sexual orientation, or economic status .1
40 
Recently, a case brought before the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal involved a 
s. 15 challenge to the funding criteria applied under the Nova Scotia Health 
Services and Insurance Act141  in relation to the provision of IVF and ICSI. In 
Cameron v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General),142 the appellants argued that the 
failure to fund ICSI and IVF constituted discrimination on the grounds of dis-
ability under the Charter. The majority of the Court of Appeal, Chipman and 
Pugsley N.A., found that the policy of not insuring IVF and ICSI draws a dis-
tinction between the fertile and infertile. Only the infertile need, but do not ob-
tain, full coverage for the use of RTs. The majority recognized the social, 
cultural, and political context of infertility and concluded that "infertile people 
can be classified as physically disabled."143  Such a distinction based on personal 
characteristics was either an enumerated or analogous grounds under Charter 
s. 15(1).1 This distinction amounts to adverse effect discrimination: 
The government has failed to ameliorate the position of the infertile compared 
with fertile people. They are unequally treated because they are denied a medi-
cally recommended treatment appropriate for them. The fertile on the other hand 
have no restrictions on access to Medicare for pre-natal treatments and treatments 
relating to childbirth. "Every aspect is covered."  45  
The Court of Appeal, however, found that the exclusion of IVF and ICSI 
from public health insurance coverage was justifiable under Charter s. 1. The 
government's policy tries to establish the best possible health care coverage 
given limited financial resources, which means controlling health care costs by 
excluding some services. The objective of this policy was determined pressing 
and substantial. The exclusion of IVF and ICSI was rationally connected to the 
aim of the legislation. The Majority also held that the Camerons' Charter rights 
to equality were minimally impaired by the exclusion, and that the effect of the 
exclusion on these rights was proportional to achieving the legislative objec-
tives. 
139 (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 437 (B.C.S.C.). 
140 Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 554. 
141 R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 197. 
142 (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 611 (N.S.C.A.), affg (1999), 172 N.S.R. (2d) 227 (S.C.), leave to 
143 
appeal dismissed (without reasons), [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 531. 
Ibid., at 655 (D.L.R.). 
144 In separate reasons, Bateman J.A. rejected the distinction drawn between the infertile and the 
fertile as a grounds for discrimination under Charter s. 15, instead taking a more restrained 
145 
approach to interfering with governmental decisions. 
Supra, note 142 at 654-55 (D.L.R.). 
146 
Ibid., at 663 (D.L.R.). See Eldridge v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, per 
La Forest 1., at para. 85. 
147 
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law of informed consent in Canada. See also the Ontario Health Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. 
1996, c. 2, Sch. A., which supersedes the common law in its broad application to treatment. 
Section 2 of the Act defines treatment as "anything that is done for a therapeutic, preventive, 
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Reibi v. Hughes, supra, note 147. 
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possibility of low birth-weight babies in addition to other social factors and fi-
nancial costs. The precise nature of the information to be communicated by the 
physician to the patient under informed consent in the context of reproductive 
technologies has not been established by case law. 
The physician may inform the patients directly, or refer them to counsel-
lors. Independent counselling might avoid some concerns over a physician's 
potential bias in providing treatment services. Moreover, independent coun-
selling may support the timely provision of needed information on new and 
changing reproductive technologies. The Royal Commission recognized the 
importance of patients having "time to discuss and fully comprehend the 
meaning and implications of consent," and that consent should be revocable 
"at any stage of treatment without jeopardizing future care or treatment."149 
The Royal Commission recommended a standardization of informative mate-
rials, including alternatives to treatment, such as adoption and living without 
children. 
The importance of informed consent to the use of RTs is reinforced in the 
draft AHRA. As noted earlier, the preamble to the draft legislation includes 
respect for autonomy and the promotion of free and informed consent as a 
core principle. In addition, s. 6 of the draft AHRA specifies the requirement 
of written informed consent in relation to a number of practices under the 
draft legislation. Pursuant to s. 6(1), in order to use donated human reproduc-
tive material to create an embryo or to assist in human reproduction, the do-
nor must have consented in writing. Section 6(2) makes it an offence to 
remove human reproductive material from a donor's body after the donor's 
death to facilitate human reproduction unless the donor provided his or her 
prior written consent. Use of an in vitro embryo (or any part of one) for the 
purpose of research or the prevention, diagnosis or treatment of disease, in-
jury or disability would constitute an offence under s. 6(3) unless the donor 
gave written consent. The specific disclosure requirements with respect to 
providing consent for purposes of these sections, however, have not been set 
out in the draft legislation but may be specified in regulations 
150 
C. STATUS OF GAMETES AND EMBRYOS 
A couple that decides to reproduce using RTs may part company, or one or both 
of them may die, at some stage of reproduction. They might have placed their 
gametes (sperm and ova) separately in storage banks, or have already generated 
an embryo also frozen and stored in a bank. In difficult cases, courts may be 
called upon to determine the status of gametes and embryos, and who should 
have an interest in, and dispositional control over them - that is, who should 
have the power to control human reproductive materials and ultimately, human 
reproduction along specific genetic lines. The law may protect the rights and 
interests of: the producers (the genetic contributors) of reproductive "materials"; 
149 Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 550. 
150 Section 40(1)(c) of the draft AHRA. 
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While the Cameron decision for the first time recognizes that unequal access 
to RTs as a treatment for infertility amounts to a Charter infringement, the in-
fringement was deemed less serious - and justifiable given the government's 
objective to control health care costs. Rather than take a proactive approach, the 
Court deferred to the government and its chosen administration for determining 
which services would be "medically necessary" as part of a comprehensive and 
cost-effective health care system. The Court of Appeal followed the Supreme 
Court of Canada decision in Eldridge, holding that the exclusion of RTs from 
the coverage of public health insurance falls within the government's "wide 
latitude" to make decisions about the distribution of limited resources, espe-
cially if the government must choose between disadvantaged groups when dis-
tributing social benefits. 141 
B. INFORMED CONSENT 
Access to RTs by infertile individuals requires adequate information and 
counselling upon which to base a decision and consent to treatment. Inade-
quate information concerning the potential benefits costs and risks of RTs as 
well as prejudiced forms of communication, might influence an individual's 
choice to use RTs. It is important, therefore, that communication between 
physicians and prospective patients remains mutually open and accessible. 
Moreover, it is through such communication, necessary for informed consent, 
that non-visible discriminatory factors may become influential. In current 
practice, physicians may, under the facade of "legitimate medical criteria," 
inquire about the person's lifestyle, including sexual history and orientation. 
Keeping in mind that two chapters of this book are devoted to consent, we 
will now explore specific issues in the context of RTs. 
The common law in Canada requires that a physician obtain a patient's in-
formed consent prior to performing a medical procedure on that patient.'47 This 
means that the patient must be informed about the benefits and risks of treat-
ment, alternative courses of action, and the consequences of not having the 
treatment. Moreover, the standard for disclosure is not what the reasonable phy-
sician would see fit to disclose, but what the reasonable person in the patient's 
position would want to know.148 The relevant information for in vitro fertiliza-
tion, for example, would include success rates of the procedure, including a 
clarification of the meaning of "success rates" (i.e., conception or live birth). 
Patients should also be informed about the potential for multiple births and the 
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the non-genetic "parents"; the biomedical researchers and clinical physicians 
who transfer the materials and help generate the products of conception; the 
hospitals and the owners of storage and handling facilities; the interests of these 
"products" as potential life forms; and the interests of society-at-large. The law 
might be called upon to address such issues in the staging and evaluation of life-
forming processes, from pre-conception arrangements to the definition of death. 
The framing of the legal issues that arise will depend, In part, upon whether 
gametes and embryos are considered as property, persons, or something in-
between. The following section explores law's responses to the status of repro-
ductive "materials" (sperm and ova) and the "products" of conception (zygotes, 
embryos, and fetuses).  15' The primary issue of the status of gametes and em-
bryos implicates a range of existing law including property, contracts, wills and 
trusts, torts, criminal law, and constitutional law. 
1. The Property Approach 
One approach to the characterization of gametes and embryos focuses on the 
concept of property.  152  Property refers not to physical objects, but to "rights of 
control or domination" over objects or activities. A traditional property ap-
proach treats sperm, ova, and embryos as objects to be controlled like any other. 
The reason for this treatment as objects centres on their generation as a product 
of one's body and the fact that they are alienable from it. According to some 
proponents of a property model, each individual is said to have dominion and 
control over her or his body, including its derivatives such as blood, sperm, ova 
and embryos.'53  It has also been argued that each individual should have the 
right to exclusively control the uniquely identifying information contained in 
r her or his genes. The argument in favour of viewing the body and its parts as 
property is supported by the understanding that property is considered uniquely 
151 
The following section focuses on gametes, zygotes (pre-embryos), and embryos. For a more 
detailed discussion on fetuses, see chapter 9, "The Legal Regulation of Women's Reproductive 
Capacity in Canada." 
152 
See M. Litman & G. Robertson, "Reproductive Technology: Is a Property Law Regime 
Appropriate?" in Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies Overview of Legal 
Issues in New Reproductive Technologies vol 3 (Ottawa Minister of Supply and Services 
Canada 1993) at 233 M Litman & G Robertson The Common Law Status of Genetic 
Material in B Knoppers T Caulfield & T D Kinsella eds., Legal Rights and Human Genetic 
Material (Toronto Emond Montgomery,  1996) at 51 M Hirtle Civil Law and the Status of 
Human Genetic Material, in Legal Rights and Human Genetic Material" in B. Knoppers, 
T. Caulfield & T.D. Kinsella, eds., Legal Rights and Human Genetic Material (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 1996) at 85; I. Kennedy, "The Moral Status of the Embryo" in 
I Kennedy Treat Me Right Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford Clarendon Press 
1991) at 119; B. Steinbock, "Sperm as Property" (1995)6 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 57; B. Brown, 
Reconciling Property Law With Advances in Reproductive Science (1995) 6 Stan L & Pol y 
Rev. 73 D Walther Ownership of the Fertilized Ovum In Vitro (1992)26 Fam L Q 235 153 
See Litman & Robertson The Common Law Status of Genetic Material supra note 152 at 
60 Litman & Robertson Reproductive Technology Is a Property Law Regime Appropriate? 
supra note 152 at 250 
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personal and therefore private. 154  If my body and its parts do not belong to me, 
then to whom do they belong? The primary motivation in favour of regarding 
gametes and embryos as property, therefore, is to ensure that the individuals 
who generated them have the full power to control their ultimate use. 
Alternatively, some academics argue in favour of quasi-property approaches 
where, for example, gametes would have special status as property.  155  A quasi-
property approach might affirm personal control and rights over disposition of 
gametes and/or embryos, but deny the right to alienate these materials for com-
mercial purposes or for remuneration. This approach would argue that an object 
may be property (in its weakest form, without all traditional incidents) for some 
purposes but not others.  15' The potential suspension of reproductive stages, and 
the recognition of a form of potential life, generates obvious concerns of de-
humanization. By removing embryos and ova from the body, the only place 
where they had existed prior to the advent of RTs, a de facto condition of objec-
tification is created. While the legal characterization of human reproductive 
materials has not been determined in Canada, it has been indirectly considered. 
In ter Neuzen v. Kom157 the Supreme Court of Canada considered the case of 
a woman who underwent artificial insemination and contracted HIV through the 
donated semen. One argument raised by the plaintiff in her law suit against the 
physician who performed AID was the existence of an implied condition or war-
ranty that the semen he used be of merchantable quality and fit for its purposes 
under contract law and the Sale of Goods Act.  15' The Court first rejected the ar-
gument under the Sale of Goods Act, which only applies if a contract existed for 
the sale of "primarily" goods rather than medical services.159 The Court then 
considered the specific nature of the contract and the relationship between the 
parties in order to determine whether the parties intended to imply such a war-
ranty at common law. The Court noted the medical context and vulnerability 
of physicians, stating that "it must be recognized that biological products such 
as blood and semen, unlike manufactured products, carry certain inherent 
risks."60 The Court held that no implied warranty of fitness and merchantabil-
ity could exist in the circumstances, and if such a warranty did exist, it would 
be met by the physician's reasonable care.n  While the Court did not directly 
154 
For example, see Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 
1988), in Litman & Robertson, "Reproductive Technology: Is a Property Law Regime 
155 
Appropriate?" supra, note 152 at 251-53. 
See Litman & Robertson, "Reproductive Technology: Is a Property Law Regime Appropriate?" 
supra, note 152 at 232, 247 (the authors support a sui generis approach, using examples such as 
156 
law's dealing with human corpses). 
Litman & Robertson, "The Common Law Status of Genetic Material," supra, note 152 at 67. 
157 [1995] 3 S.C.R. 674. 
158 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 410. 
159 The Court, however, did not consider the issue of whether the sperm was donated rather than 
sold. 
160 
Supra, note 157 at 717. 
161 It has been previously argued that the transfer of sperm should be legally characterized as a 
"sale" in order to resort to the protection of commercial law; A.M. Hodgson, "The Warranty of 
Sperm: A Modest Proposal to Increase the Accountability of Sperm Banks and Physicians in 
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confront the issue of the characterization of semen in ter Neuzen v. Korn, its 
refusal to extend the application of the Sale of Goods Act and the implied war- 
ranty at common law, suggests that the court recognizes that semen has a char-
acter distinct from "merchantable goods." We will now turn to an examination 
of how the legal characterization of human reproductive materials has been con-
sidered in other jurisdictions. 
In Hecht v. Superior Court of the State of California fdr the County of Los 
Angeles (Kane), u 2̀  the California Court of Appeal held that cryopreserved sperm 
was a "unique category of property" as part of the estate of the deceased do-
nor.163  The value of the donor's sperm arose from its potential to generate life 
upon fertilization, thus providing the donor an interest "in the nature of owner-
ship." In Davis v. Davis,'6" the court directly confronted the issue of whether 
cryopreserved pre-embryos are property. The Davis couple underwent in vitro 
fertilization, storing their pre-embryos for later use. They eventually divorced, 
leading to a custody battle over the frozen pre-embryos. Ms. Davis sought to 
implant the embryos. She argued the "best interests of the child" test, and that 
the pre-embryos were in fact "living persons." In opposition, Mr. Davis con-
tended that the pre-embryos were under joint control. Justice Young of the Ten-
nessee Circuit Court ruled in favour of parens patriae jurisdiction and the 
family law approach emphasizing the best interests of the child, and thus re-
jecting a traditional property approach.165  In rejecting the "bailment" approach 
of York v. Jones, 166 Young J. focussed on a "minority" scientific opinion, sug-
gesting that the differentiation of cells in such embryos means that they are fully 
constituted, "living persons." When faced with legal classification, Young J. 
the Performance of Artificial Insemination Procedures" (1993) 175 Specialty Law Digest: 
Health Care Law 9. Hodgson claims that such characterization would hold sperm banks and 
physicians liable for breach of implied warranties. This argument, however, does not address 
the inadequacies of commercial law in dealing with sensitive reproductive "materials" of a 
unique nature. 
62 
20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993). 
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Superior Court, ibid., at 288-89 cited Parpalaix as an example where a court rejected 
traditional property and contract analyses, focussing instead on the husband's unequivocal 
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717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (a property-based approach where the court upheld the 
transfer of pre-embryos between fertilization institutes). 
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relied upon medical science, without much discussion about the problems of 
deference to medical science and the lack of critical inquiry and challenge.  167 
By the time the case reached the Court of Appeal, both parties had re-
married. Ms. Davis no longer wished to implant the pre-embryos, but instead 
wanted to donate them to other women. Thus, the facts and perhaps the support 
of public policy had changed direction. The Court of Appeal reversed the previ-
ous ruling, awarding instead joint control over the pre-embryos. In the Davis 
case, the ex utero pre-embryos were frozen at an early stage of development. 
The American Court recognized that Mr. Davis had a "constitutionally protected 
right not to beget a child where no pregnancy has taken place."  68 Some aca-
demics have argued that the Davis analysis sounds "suspiciously property-
like."69  And yet, the court's reference to the fact that the embryos had been cre-
ated but not yet implanted supports Ms. Davis' reproductive contribution in re-
lation to the father. At the same time, the court recognized the father's 
contribution and his wish not to proceed. In the end, the husband received a 
complete "veto" over the disposition of the frozen ex utero pre-embryos. The 
Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal decision. 170 The Su-
preme Court, however, noted that "pre-embryos are not, strictly speaking, either 
'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim category that entitles them to spe-
cial respect because of their potential for human life."7' It focussed on the 
Davis' interest "in the nature of ownership, to the extent that they have deci-
sional authority,"72  in light of a balance of opposing interests by the two genetic 
contributors. The Supreme Court in Davis also suggested two exceptions to the 
right of one progenitor to veto parenthood: (1) where one parent cannot other-
wise become a parent; (2) where a prior agreement between the parties indicates 
their clear intentions for the disposition of embryos. 
In Kass v. Kass  '171  the New York Court of Appeal considered a pre-existing 
written agreement between the parties, specifying disposition of the cryopre-
served pre-embryos in the event that the parties subsequently disagreed. Ms. 
Kass unsuccessfully underwent numerous TYF cycles before the last cycle in 
which cryopreservation was used for the first time to store pre-embryos. Prior to 
this last cycle, Maureen and Steven Kass had entered into a written agreement 
167 
See Litman & Robertson, "Reproductive Technology: Is a Property Law Regime Appropriate?" 
supra, note 152 at 259. The authors note that scientific arguments are not determinative of this 
particular legal issue. See Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530 at 553. See generally, RJR-
MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1995]3 S.C.R. 199. 
65 59  U.S.L.W. 2205 (Tenn. Ct. App., 1990) at 2206. 
169 Litman & Robertson, "Reproductive Technology: Is a Property Law Regime Appropriate?" 
supra, note 152 at 260. 
170 Davis v. Davis, supra, note 165. 
'' Ibid., at 597. 
172 Ibid. See M. Litman & G. Robertson, "Reproductive Technology: Is a Property Law Regime 
Appropriate?" in Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Overview of Legal 
Issues in New Reproductive Technologies, vol. 3 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 
Canada, 1993) at 79. 
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concerning the storage and disposition of frozen pre-embryos. After unsuccess-
ful treatment, they divorced. Maureen Kass then sought sole custody of the pre-
embryos for implantation into herself. A unanimous seven member panel of the 
New York Court of Appeal upheld the written agreement between the parties, 
providing the IVF programme with dispositional control over the pre-embryos 
for purposes of "biological studies" and "research investigation." The Court of 
Appeal affirmed the 3-2 decision of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
which had in turn reversed the trial court decision. The Court of Appeal held 
that the disposition of frozen pre-embryos was governed by a mutual consent 
agreement and the common law principles for contractual interpretation. Al-
though the Court of Appeal cited, with approval, the Davis decision and the 
"special type of property" approach, it remained steadfast to the traditional 
common law categories of contract law and informed consent. The Court of 
Appeal emphasized the "seriousness and integrity of the consent process" and 
the certainty obtained from contract, discounting Maureen Kass' previous ef- 
forts and loss of reproductive capacity. - 
In Canada, the courts have yet to decide on the issue of whether or not repro-
ductive materials should be considered as "property."  174 A recent lower court 
decision in Alberta, however, has commented on some of the American juris-
prudence in this area in the context of determining whether separate damages 
could be awarded for loss of a fetus. In Martin v. Mineral Springs Hospital,175 
Rowbotham J. considered a negligence suit brought against a doctor concerning 
a stillbirth. According to Rowbotham J., the current law in Canada does not 
provide separate damages for the loss of a fetus due to negligent conduct, and 
therefore runs counter to a line of American cases that have awarded damages 
for the loss of in vitro embryos.  176  In Rowbotham J.'s view, the cited American 
decisions: 
treat the embryo as property, and provide compensation for the loss of a chattel. 
Notwithstanding the embryo's classification as property, the damages granted in-
clude awards for pain and suffering. See: Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital (1978) 
74 Civ. L.D. 3588 (memorandum decision) (U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D.N.Y.) and Davis v. 
Davis (1990), 16 F.L.R. 1535 (U.S. Tenn. Ct. App., 1990). However repugnant 
the 'property' classification may be, it presents the quandary that the loss of an 
embryo at an early cellular stage of development may be compensable, while a 
fully developed unborn child is not. 177 
It is our view that the above reading of the American jurisprudence is incor-
rect. As discussed previously, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis 
found that pre-embryos are neither persons nor property, but "occupy an interim 
174 
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supra, note 172 at 51. Litman and Robertson warn of the symbolic and psychological effects on 
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Ibid., at paras. 25-26. 
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Ibid., at para. 26. 
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category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for hu-
man life."78 The Davis Court, moreover, decided the issue of dispositional 
authority over the embryos, and did not consider the issue of damages for the 
loss of embryos. In Del Zio, 
 171 the Court awarded damages of $50,000 for the 
plaintiff's emotional distress when a physician deliberately destroyed her in 
vitro eggs (not embryos). The eggs had been placed in a petri dish with the aim 
of fertilization by her husband's sperm. Del Zio raises again the distinction be-
tween gametes and embryos, with the latter often recognized as deserving more 
respect for its potential for human life. 
Gametes and embryos might be considered more like property than persons, 
or vice versa, depending upon the stage of development and the context of the 
owner's assertion of control."°  Some commentators argue that the property ap-
proach "may well be able to accommodate competing interests in a more re-
sponsive and responsible manner than the law pertaining to persons."81 Yet, the 
property and quasi-property approaches seem inadequate since they objectify 
human reproductive "materials" and disregard important social and moral di-
mensions such as the sanctity of human life and the power relationships in hu-
man reproduction. Moreover, the concerns over commodification and 
commercialization would appear to outweigh any arguments in favour of treat-
ing gametes and embryos as a form of property - to be controlled and domi-
nated as objects. The use of a property approach, even in the absence of the 
language of "property" and "ownership," does not provide a convincing solu-
tion,182  but merely hides the substantive problems discussed above. Moreover, 
the category of property has been much criticized as disregarding such feminist 
concerns as: "the objectification of women; the economic exploitation of 
women; the denigration of human reproduction and the treatment of women as 
'baby-making machines'; women's alienation from their bodies; the commodi-
fication and destruction of human values."183  It would, therefore, seem odd to 
consider gametes and embryos strictly as traditional property. On the other 
hand, courts in Canada and other common law jurisdictions have so far shown 
no indication that gametes and embryos have full status as legal persons.'
84 To 
do otherwise, the courts would oppose the reproductive freedom of the parents. 
It remains to be seen how Canadian courts might work beyond traditional prop-
erty conceptions of gametes and embryos. 
178 Supra, note 165. 
179 Del Zio v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18443 (US Dist. Ct., 
SD NY, Apr. 12, 1978, No. 74-3558). See also Kass v. Kass, supra, note 173. 
180 See Litman & Robertson, "Reproductive Technology: Is a Property Law Regime Appropriate?" 
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2, The Personhood Approach 
The personhood approach basically treats gametes and embryos as full legal 
persons, with all rights and interests that other living persons might enjoy. This 
approach emphasizes one's personal control over unique genetic information as 
essential to one's personality and liberty; human beings are considered inviola-
ble and inalienable. This approach differs from a property approach in two ma-
jor respects: (1) it does not support commercialization, and (2) information is 
considered to be common to all persons, rather than a "thing" to be appropri-
ated.185 The personhood approach, however, must contend with the problem that 
gametes and embryos can be separated from the person(s) who generated them 
and be implanted in third persons. Can these still be viewed as extensions of the 
person who generated them, or should these be seen as autonomous persons 
imbued with the full range of the rights of persons? Under a personhood ap-
proach, destruction of gametes and embryos could be tantamount to murder, 
while their commercial exploitation may be the equivalent of slavery. 
Quebec civil law considers the control over one's body in light of "rights to 
personality" and individual liberty.186 In civil law, a personality rights approach 
seems more accepted for personal control over one's body and its contained 
information. The Civil Code of Quebec holds that every human being has, 
among other rights, the right to life, personal security, inviolability, and the in-
tegrity of the person.187 Marie Hirtle notes that the "multiple personality rights 
found under Quebec civil law would ... confer the right to follow, to examine, 
and to control information concerning and originating from a person."88 The 
basic presupposition is that "the human body is dissolubly both person and 
thing."89 This bespeaks the in-between approach, where gametes and embryos 
are treated as somewhere between property and persons, depending on the spe-
cific context. This is the sui generis approach discussed below. 
3. Sui Generis and Other Approaches 
Rather than treat gametes and embryos as one of the two extremes - as objects 
(property) or as subjects (persons) - the courts may consider some type of sui 
generis or relational approach on a case-by-case basis.'9° It has been said that 
"the emerging trend is to characterize the legal status of the embryos ex utero 
185 
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and gametes as sui generis.""' Sui generis means "its own type" or "class by 
itself." In other words, such an approach denies any analogy between this class 
of objects and any other type of relationship or entity. In using this approach, 
the focus remains on the factual setting and "particularly, on the relationship 
between the parties, and not the genetic material itself.""' A sui generis ap-
proach, whether considered under the concept of property or personhood, sup-
ports a more flexible consideration of relations among persons and things. It 
also emphasizes the application of policy interests on a case-by-case basis. On 
the other hand, while a sui generis approach might escape the traditional con-
straints of a property approach, it does so only to rely upon the discretion of 
courts. 
This approach may be criticized as simply begging the question, "To what 
class do gametes and embryos belong?" In order to fill the legal void and arrive 
at a reasoned outcome, the courts may determine that these materials or relation-
ships are "like" persons or property, thereby falling back on familiar statuses or 
relationships in an effort to arrive at a more certain legal outcome. The sui gene-
ris approach may ultimately become self-defeating and result in a body of in-
consistent analogies applied in different cases. 
A possible way out of this dilemma may be offered by the relational ap-
proach, which acknowledges that these materials differ from existing categories 
but recognizes the intrinsic interests which are generated by the manner in 
which these materials emerge and the purposes to which they are applied. The 
relational (or relationship) approach provides an alternative to that of traditional 
property, personhood, and sui generis. The relational approach focuses on rela-
tionships and the conditions that foster capacity to form relationships.'93 Rather 
than focussing on individualistic conceptions, such as rights, the relational ap-
proach acknowledges relationships among individuals and communities, for 
example, those of power, responsibility, trust, obligation, respect, and caretak-
ing.194 In doing so, the law might sensitively adapt to changing societal values 
and advances in RTs, and perhaps better address issues of "control, decision-
making authority, and responsibility" for potential human life. 
Although the relational approach provides a critical alternative to the tradi-
tional property and personhood approaches, choices and decisions must yet be 
made about the status and disposition of gametes and embryos, and the relation-
ships among the women and men who contribute genetically or non-genetically 
to human reproduction. The choices and decisions resulting from the resolution 
of legal disputes in practice create hierarchies of relationships deemed worthy of 
legal recognition and status. A relational approach, however, may appear useful 
in allowing courts to better recognize relationships of power and control over 
191 M. Litman & G. Robertson, "The Common Law Status of Genetic Material" in B. Knoppers, 
T. Caulfield & T.D. Kinsella, eds., Legal Rights and Human Genetic Material (Toronto: 
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the lives of genetic contributors and gestational providers, especially those 
women who bear additional responsibilities,"' as well as in recognizing gametes 
and embryos as potential human life. As the Royal Commission states, it is "es-
sential to ensure that zygotes (and presumably, gametes) are treated with respect 
because of their connections to the human community."  9' Having discussed 
various conceptual frameworks for the status and control of gametes and em-
bryos, we now analyze specific legal issues related to they control and use of 
gametes and embryos. 
I IXt,zii u 's wi iSi ij u pi ii D u i't• 
1. Gamete and Embryo Donation 
A woman may wish to reproduce using the sperm or ova of known or anony-
mous donors in a number of circumstances including: the absence of a male 
partner, the existence of male factor infertility in her partner, or the desire to 
avoid the transferring of infectious diseases Or genetic conditions to offspring. 
Ovum and embryo donation can be used in cases of female factor infertility, or 
for example, where two women choose to share the genetic and gestational as-
pects of pregnancy. In some cases sperm and ovum may be treated or otherwise 
manipulated to facilitate fertilization. We now consider the regulation of gamete 
and embryo donation in Canada, highlighting differences encountered in their 
regulation. The analysis will illustrate a range of solutions depending upon the 
choice of conceptual framework to be applied to gametes and embryos: whether 
they are treated as property, persons, or something in between (sui generis). 
(a) Gametes 
The special nature of gametes (sperm and ova) has led to attempts to regulate 
their use and transfer in Canada and elsewhere. In Canada, the federal govern-
ment now regulates the processing and distribution of semen for assisted con-
ception.'97 This legislation addresses the screening of semen for health and 
safety purposes in assisted human reproduction. While the law regulates the 
processing and distribution of donor semen and thus sperm, it does not regulate 
donor ova. Since the draft AHRA has not yet been enacted, and where express 
legislation concerning gametes is absent, one could interpret human tissue leg-
islation as applying to gametes. Whereas all provinces have legislation to con-
trol the transfer of human tissues for organ transplantation, several provinces 
have broadly defined "tissue" and do not expressly exclude gametes and em-
bryos. It may be argued that gametes and embryos are unique in their potential 
to create life and that they are not necessarily "replaceable by natural processes 
of repair."9' Although human tissue legislation may or may not apply to gam- 
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etes and embryos, Canadian courts may find it useful to draw parallels to the 
statutory provisions of such legislation. 
Gamete donation may occur during the donor's lifetime, or after her or his 
death. The common law has distinguished between the various forms of a gift 
inter vivos and a gift causa mortis (or postmortem gifts). These two scenarios 
have traditionally led to different responses under the law of property. The 
transfer of reproductive "materials" and the use of RTs, however, require a more 
complex approach to legal analysis than traditionally applied under the law of 
property. We will now consider the regulation of donor gametes as an inter vi-
vos gift and as a postmortem gift. 
The preliminary issue is whether or not an individual can legally transfer his 
or her gametes for implantation into others. Several provincial statutes regulate 
who may donate human tissues generally and genetic material specifically. Sec-
tion 3(1) of the British Columbia Human Tissue Gift Act, for example, states that 
a person may consent to an inter vivos gift for transplant if he or she is at least 
19 years old, mentally competent, and able to make a free and informed deci-
sion. Under s. 4, the gift can be made "for therapeutic purposes, medical educa-
tion or scientific research." Article 538 of the Civil Code of Quebec provides 
that a person may donate gametes for "[p]articipation in the parental project of 
another person by way of a contribution of genetic material." The draft AHRA 
would allow for the donation of gametes under a regime that combines prohibi-
tions and licensed conditions to control their transfer and the requirements for 
consent. In relation to sperm and ova, the draft Act defines "donor" as "the indi-
vidual from whose body they are obtained, whether for consideration or not."99 
It also prohibits the use of sperm or ovum from a person under 18 years of age, 
except as provided for in the regulations.20° 
Gametes from a donor who has since died may be used for reproduction. Per-
sons can now store their gametes in sperm or ova banks for subsequent donation 
after death. It seems that courts will recognize the special nature of gametes, and 
requirements and conditions for the exchange of human tissue, especially in the 
case where contributors have since died.20' As a matter of public policy, how-
ever, some argue that the gametes of deceased donors should not be used for 
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 211, s. 1. But see also art. 19 C.C.Q., which states that a person may "... 
alienate a part of his body only if that part is capable of regeneration and provided that no 
serious risk to his health results." Article 25 of the Civil Code of Quebec requires that "[t]he 
alienation by a person of a part or product of his body shall be gratuitous; it may not be 
repeated if it involves a risk to his health." In Ontario, Manitoba, and PET., human tissue 
legislation specifically excludes gametes and embryos; see supra, note 66. 
Section 2 of the draft AHRA. Since the draft AHRA has not yet been enacted, medical 
professionals may refer to the Joint Policy Statement of Medical Professionals, which 
recognizes that the transfer of sperm and eggs are morally acceptable only for non-commercial 
cases of donation and where the donors provide informed consent; supra, note 117 at 18. 
200 Section 7(2) of the draft AHRA. 
201 M. Martin et al., "The Limits of Freedom of Contract: The Commercialization of Reproductive 
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reproduction because of the possible effects on children born without live ge-
netic parents. Ethical issues also arise when gametes are retrieved from donors 
who are deceased persons or fetuses. For example, a woman might wish to use 
sperm from a dead male partner,202  or a man might wish to use ova from a dead 
female partner to be fertilized by in vitro fertilization and implanted in a gesta- 
tional mother.203  The transfer of gametes, however, may be considered morally 
unacceptable where retrieval of sperm and ova requires an invasive procedure 
on a "brain dead" person, in contrast to retrieval from existing supplies in stor-
age banks, or where the gamete donor would likely not have consented. Further 
issues arise as to whether or not the deceased should be considered the legal 
father or mother for purposes of birth registration or inheritance. 
There are no Canadian cases that deal with the issue of a postmortem transfer 
of gametes. In the absence of specific legislation, Canadian courts may draw 
analogies to organ transplantation under human tissue gift legislation and per-
haps the law of adoption. If ova and sperm fall under human tissue gift legisla-
tion, postmortem reproduction may be considered legal. The British Columbia 
Human Tissue Gift Act, for example, provides that a person, if she or he is at 
least 19 years old, may consent to a postmortem gift, "... in writing signed by 
the person at any time ... or orally in the presence of at least 2 witnesses during 
the person's last illness ......204  Where the deceased person has not given consent 
and dies, or cannot give consent by reason of injury or disease, and the person's 
death is imminent, s. 5(1) provides a lengthy hierarchical list of persons, begin-
ning with spouses, and followed by: children at the age of majority, parents, 
brothers or sisters, or any other next of kin, who may, on behalf of that person, 
consent to transplantation. The consent provided for under s. 5(1) must occur in 
writing, or orally, in the presence of at least two witnesses. Section 5(l)(f) pro-
vides that where no relative can be found, transplantation may be authorized by 
"the person lawfully in possession of the body other than, if the person died in 
hospital, the administrative head of the hospital." Under s. 5(2), consent cannot 
be given if there is reason to believe that the deceased person would have ob-
jected. The draft AHRA, if enacted, would prohibit the posthumous use of "hu-
man reproductive material" from a donor's body after her or his death, unless 
the donor consented in writing for that specific purpose.205 
In dealing with the novel issue of postmortem reproduction, and in the ab-
sence of express legislation, Canadian courts may consider the jurisprudence in 
other countries. For postmortem reproduction, one of the main issues is whether 
the deceased intended to have children after death. In Parpalaix v. CECOS,206  
202 
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the French Tribunaux de grande instance discussed the dispositional control 
over the donor's sperm deposit, and the issue of whether the donor intended to 
have children during his lifetime or after death. The Tribunaux held in favour of 
the deceased donor's wishes to have children after death. In Hecht v. Superior 
Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles (Kane),207 the 
California Court of Appeal recognized the deceased donor's expressed intentions. 
In Hecht, the court held that the donor had an ownership interest under at least 
an "interim category," if not personal property law. In the case of R. v. Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood,205 the English Court of 
Appeal considered a woman's attempts to use the sperm samples she obtained 
from her husband while he lay in a comatose state. The husband died shortly 
afterwards. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990,209 clearly re-
quired expressed written consent of a donor for the taking and use of his sperm, 
including for posthumous reproduction. No written consent existed in this case.210 
The sale and commercialization of sperm and ova have raised obvious ethical 
issues, despite the law's insistence that the transfer of gametes be treated as gifts 
only. There is no express legislation that deals with the sale of gametes, al-
though the regulations under the Food and Drugs Act,211 as discussed previ-
ously, uses the language of "donation" when dealing with the processing and 
use of semen for assisted conception. The control of gametes and embryos, if 
deemed human tissue, may be subject to legislative provisions that limit their 
transfer for non-commercial purposes. In most provinces, human tissue legisla-
tion prohibits any dealings of human tissue for valuable consideration or for 
commercial purposes; the transfer of human tissue is considered a gift, not a 
sale .21' The British Columbia Human Tissue Gift Act, for example, states: "a 
person must not buy, sell or otherwise deal in, directly or indirectly, for a valu-
able consideration, any tissue for a transplant, or any body or parts other than 
blood or a blood constituent, for therapeutic purposes, medical education or 
scientific research .',21' The law generally recognizes that commercial exchanges 
of human tissues are invalid as being contrary to public policy.214 Similarly, art. 
25 of the Civil Code of Quebec states, "[tihe alienation by a person of a part or 
product of his [sic] body shall be gratuitous; it may not be repeated if it involves 
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a risk to his [sic] health." The draft AHRA, if enacted, would expressly prohibit 
"the purchase or offer to purchase sperm or ova from a donor or a person acting 
on behalf of a donor or advertise for the purchase of sperm or ova from a do-
nor," where "purchase" includes "to acquire or dispose of in exchange for prop-
erty or services."215  Individuals and facilities with a licence under the draft Act, 
however, may offer donors reimbursement of expenses "incurred in the course 
of donating any sperm or ovum."216Although reimbursemnt for gamete dona-
tion is usually limited to reasonable expenses, the definition of "expenses" is a 
matter for interpretation. 
Moreover, there has been much concern over the exploitation of women who 
exchange "spare" eggs (or ova) to be implanted in other women in return for 
compensation or reduced fees for in vitro fertilization or other medical serv-
ices.217  In some medical practices, women patients are asked for the "designated 
donation" of ova in exchange for services or reduced rates. The Royal Commis-
sion would prohibit physicians from revoking services when a woman chooses 
not to donate spare ova. According to the Tr-Council Policy Statement, a set of 
guidelines for federal research funding, the use of gametes obtained from com-
mercial transactions, including exchange for services, for purposes of research is 
unethical .21' Rather than suggesting an absolute ban on such exchanges, several 
commentators have emphasized the importance of women's informed consent to 
gamete donation in these circumstances. It has been suggested that informed 
consent might ameliorate the power imbalances and exploitation that women 
may face due to socio-economic disparities. Others contend that truly informed 
consent is not possible in light of an already existing state of gender inequities. 
We have previously discussed the issue of informed consent. However, it is 
noteworthy to mention that Canadian courts have not yet faced the issue of 
revocation of consent by a gamete donor. One might argue that the option to 
revoke consent prior to actual implantation of gametes into recipients would 
empower women by making available choices in some circumstances. 
Gamete use and transfer also raises health and safety issues about the quality 
of gametes used for assisted reproduction. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
pursuant to regulations of the Food and Drugs Act219 the federal government 
regulates the processing and distribution of semen for assisted conception in 
order to avoid serious risk to the health of the patient and the child to be con- 
ceived. This issue of sperm safety has also arisen at common law. In ter Neuzen 
v. Korn220  the Supreme Court of Canada considered the case of a woman who 
215 
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216 
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underwent artificial insemination and contracted HIV through the donated se-
men. At trial before a jury, ter Neuzen claimed negligence against her physician, 
and that the prevailing medical standards were inappropriate. She also argued 
the existence of an implied condition or warranty under contract law and the 
Sale of Goods Act.221 The Court affirmed the presence of two fundamental as-
pects of a claim of professional negligence: (1) breach of duty arising from the 
failure to be aware of the risk of HIV infection through the use of artificial in-
semination; and (2) breach of duty with respect to the screening and follow-up 
of donors. The Court noted the medical context and vulnerability of physi-
cians, stating: "it must be recognized that biological products such as blood 
and semen, unlike manufactured products, carry certain inherent risks ."222 In 
the end, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that the appropriate legal basis 
upon which this case should be considered was that of negligence and sent the 
case back to trial for a determination of the negligence issue and an assessment 
of damages. 
(b) Embryos 
Embryo donation for purposes of reproduction raises different issues than those 
for gametes per Se. Given their potential for human life, embryos, like fetuses, 
deserve special attention under existing law or a future regulatory regime. In 
addition, embryos involve two genetic contributors, each with a potential inter-
est in the embryo. As well, embryos may be implanted in a gestational mother. 
The common law may therefore distinguish between in utero and ex utero em-
bryos, where the latter are located in a storage bank while the former are located 
in the womb of a gestational mother. The legal issues of control and parenthood 
become more complicated where the gestational mother differs from the genetic 
mother. Canadian courts have yet to face the difficult issue of revocation of con-
sent for the donation of an embryo by genetic parents to a gestational mother. 
Another possible scenario is the mistaken implantation of in vitro embryos into 
a gestational mother.223  Canadian courts, especially in the context of abortion, 
have acknowledged that women have full autonomy to make decisions over 
their bodies and to abort embryos or fetuses they may be carrying.224 The courts 
would likely favour the gestational mother in the control and disposition of an 
embryo that has already been implanted, at least to the point of birth. 
221 
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Embryo donation requires the informed consent of both genetic donors, if 
known.2n Consent should be clearly expressed, specific, and in writing. For em-
bryo donation particularly, an agreement might cover disposition for such con-
tingencies as the death of one or both donors. As well, an agreement could 
expressly address dispositional issues Upon the revocation of consent by one or 
both donors. 
A woman who separates from a male partner 221 may seek custody of cryopre-
served embryos in which she and her partner genetically contributed. The 
woman may wish to keep the embryos for herself for subsequent implantation. 
Or, she may wish to transfer the embryos (or dispositional authority) to a third 
party, for example, another woman or couple, or to simply destroy the embryos. 
If the male contributor is opposed to such a transfer or destruction, and if Cana-
dian courts support joint control, then the woman would have no legal recourse. 
In the United States, the common law has so far supported joint control over 
embryo disposition where neither contributor is an anonymous donor. In the 
case of cryopreserved (or frozen) embryos, if the parties cannot mutually agree, 
then by court order or pre-conception contract, the embryo bank (where the em-
bryos are stored in cryopreservation) may allow the embryo to perish.227 In 
Davis v. Davis, 128 as we previously discussed, the court directly confronted the 
issue of whether one genetic contributor, Ms. Davis, could transfer the cryopre-
served pre-embryos to another woman, despite Mr. Davis' wishes not to pro-
ceed. In the end, the court in Davis recognized that each contributor has an 
equal say in the disposition of the frozen ex utero pre-embryos. Mr. Davis' right 
not to reproduce trumped Ms. Davis' right to transfer the embryos to another 
woman. In Kass v. Kass229  the New York Court of Appeal upheld a mutual con-
sent agreement providing dispositional control of the pre-embryos to a third 
party, the IVF programme. In effect, the court sided with Steven Kass' argument 
to uphold the initial agreement based upon the clear expression of the parties' 
original intentions. The Court of Appeal emphasized the "quintessentially per-
sonal and private" nature of the genetic parents' decision over the disposition of 
preembryos.no 
The emphasis on joint control (based on an agreement or otherwise) does not 
seem to adequately address gender-based imbalances in power and control over 
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human reproduction. Genetic parents, like those in Davis and Kass, may attempt 
to vary or revoke their consent for embryo donation.231 One or both genetic 
contributors might revoke consent for embryo donation, despite prior agreement 
to the contrary. In making decisions over control and disposition, the courts 
should consider the fact that women undergo an invasive procedure to remove 
some of their limited supply of ova for donation. In the case of one anonymous 
contributor, embryo donation may follow the same rules and principles applica-
ble to gamete donation. Moreover, the intended gestational mother might revoke 
her consent to be the recipient. In the above cases, the courts should proceed 
cautiously and with careful review of power imbalances and policy interests, in 
the absence of clear legislation. 
The disposition of embryos could also become problematic when one or both 
of the genetic contributors die. The Royal Commission recommends that em-
bryos not be stored beyond the death of one or both of the genetic contribu-
tors.232 The draft AHRA prohibits the use of "reproductive materials" without 
written consent for that specific purpose, which presumably will include the use 
of in vitro embryos after the death of one or both of the parties .
21' Again, it re-
mains to be seen how Canadian courts might decide these latter issues. As we 
discussed previously, human tissue gift legislation, if applicable to human em-
bryos, provides for the postmortem transfer of dispositional authority to non-
family members, provided that there is no "reason to believe that the person 
who died or whose death is imminent would have objected to it."2 14 
231 
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reproductive rights. While the Court recognized that the party who chooses not to become a 
biological parent usually prevails, in this case the father, MB., is capable of fathering 
additional children. In a concurring opinion, Justice Verniero endorsed the principle that 
infertile persons should have the right to use pre-embryos, over the objections of others, if this 
use is the only means to procreate (at para. 92). See also Litosvitz v. Litowitz, No. 24223-I-I1 
(Wash. App. Div. 2 10/17/2000), where each of the married couple sought control over frozen 
embryos, which were created from the husband's sperm and donated ova. The wife sought 
control of the embryos for implantation into a surrogate mother. Whereas the wife intended to 
raise the resulting child, the father did not wish to become subject to parental obligations. The 
Court affirmed the lower court ruling, relying upon different reasons, to provide the father 
control over the embryos. The egg donor contract signed by the parties did not address the 
couple's dissolution. The only genetic parent before the court, the husband has the 
constitutional right not to procreate. 
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A different scenario arises where both the woman and man had initially 
abandoned the cryopreserved embryos but later found that the embryo bank 
sought to donate them for implantation into other women. This situation, given 
the embryo's development and potential for human life, may warrant a higher 
standard of consent by both genetic contributors for the specific purposes of the 
embryo implantation, as well as a specific threshold for abandonment. 
Recognizing the controversy surrounding the donation of embryos, the draft 
AHRA, if enacted, would leave the definition of "donor" a subject matter of the 
regulations, in contrast to "gamete donor," which is directly defined in the draft 
legislation  .211  It is uncertain whether the federal government did not wish to face 
such a controversial moral issue, or whether they believed that the regulations 
would provide a more flexible framework for the law's adaptation of changing 
societal values. The draft AHRA would prohibit the purchase, sale, or the of-
fering or advertising to purchase or sell, in vitro embryos.236 While the draft Act 
prohibits only the purchase of gametes, it prohibits both purchase and sale of 
embryos. Any collection, storage, transfer, destruction, importation, or exporta-
tion of in vitro embryos would require a license.237 
tiu i tu ill] i j['D1unI fl rirniryti 
The use of donor gametes raises issues of identification and anonymity. Some 
women may choose to bear a child using the sperm or ova of anonymous do-
nors. An infertile couple may wish to combine anonymous donations of sperm 
and ova, with hopes of implanting the embryo into the woman partner as gesta-
tional mother. The availability of sperm and ova will depend upon the supply of 
and access to anonymous donor contributions, usually through sperm and ova 
banks. Donor embryos, however, may be even more difficult to locate. 
The requirement of informed consent also applies to anonymous donors. The 
donor must be informed of the specific purpose of the donation and the potential 
benefits and risks. Anonymous donors, if they provide informed consent, gener-
ally waive their beneficial interests and right to control gametes and embryos, as 
well as future child support obligations and custody rights. Thus, donors receive 
anonymity in exchange for their own relinquishment of dispositional control and 
the guarantee that no legal claims will be found against them. Canadian courts, 
moreover, tend not to hold anonymous donors liable for the quality and fitness 
created through in Vitro fertilization involved Mr. and Mrs. Rios, a wealthy California couple 
who received in Vitro fertilization in Australia. Two embryos were frozen when Mr. and Mrs. 
Rios died in an airplane crash. Apparently the Rioses left no written instructions regarding the 
fate of the "orphan embryos" and a lengthy and heated debate arose about whether the embryos 
should be destroyed, made available for anonymous donation, or deliberately gestated in order 
to permit them to inherit an intestate share of the Rioses' estate. For further discussion of this 
case and the issues it raises see: George P. Smith II, "Australia's Frozen 'Orphan' Embryos: A 
Medical, Legal and Ethical Dilemma" (1985-86) 24 J. F. L. 27. 
235 
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236 
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237 
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of the product.us  This position supports the policy interest of making avail-
able a large pool of sperm and ova for donation. Physicians or facilities as 
"processors" must maintain information about donors, including personal identi-
fication and the results of screening tests.239 Under the draft AHRA, if enacted, 
the physician or facility licensee must provide "health reporting information" 
from a donor of human reproductive material.240 Privacy concerns are raised by 
the broad definition of "health reporting information" under s. 2 of the draft Act: 
(a) the identity, personal characteristics, genetic information and medical history 
of donors of human reproductive material, persons who have undergone assisted 
reproduction procedures and persons who were conceived by means of such pro-
cedures; and (b) the custody of donated human reproductive materials and any 
uses that are made of them. 
The donor must be informed in writing of the disclosure requirements. Further 
disclosure of the information to third parties is prohibited, except with the writ-
ten consent of the donor, and except as otherwise required by law.241  
A more controversial issue arises if the donor wishes to remain anonymous, 
whereas the child seeks access to information that identifies her or his genetic 
parents. At some point the child's interest in obtaining social, cultural and medi-
cal information for her or his psychological or social well-being could override 
the policy interest to ensure a large supply of donor sperms and eggs. One pos-
sible resolution would centre on the child's access to non-identifying genetic 
information. This would, however, still lead to issues about the nature and ex-
tent of such information and its restricted availability. In serious medical cases 
where the child's health or life is at risk, key genetic information should be 
made available. In response to this issue, the draft AHRA provides that the 
Minister of Health may disclose non-identifying information about a donor to a 
person undergoing assisted reproduction with the donor's gametes or to the per-
son conceived with donor gametes, or to his or her descendants. 
 242 Identifying 
information about the donor would be released only with the written consent of 
the donor.243 
A registry is one possible solution to ensure limits to the number of offspring 
by donors and to guarantee that genetically-related children do not unknowingly 
reproduce with each other. It might also be helpful for children to receive coun-
selling prior to receiving registry information about their genetic parents. The 
existence of a donation registry, however, may lead to misuses or abuses of in-
formation by governments and private parties. In order to resolve these issues, 
Canadian courts will likely draw parallels to the statutory and common law re-
specting adoption. 
238 ter Neuzen v. Korn, supra, note 220. 
239 Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, SOR/96-254, s. 12. 
240 
Section 18(1) of the draft AHRA. 
241 
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242 
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Genetic and gestational parents, if they differ, may also have a legal obli-
gation to tell children about their genetic heritage. There seems to be a strong 
societal interest in children knowing the "genetic truth." If such obligations 
exist, and in the absence of relevant legislation, the courts will likely consider 
an appropriate age for the disclosure of the fact of donation and for the 
provision of specific information about the donor. In the absence of such dis-
closure, children might suffer from "genetic bewilderment" and social stig-
matization.244 
Children may also attempt to claim support payments or inheritance from an 
identified donor. The issue remains whether common law courts will refuse to 
provide children with legal interests against donors or their estates. In deciding 
such legal issues, Canadian courts would likely consider the "best interests of 
the child" principle, and the policy interest in the availability of anonymous 
donation. Where the child wishes, however, the donor might revoke his or her 
anonymity arrangement. 
3. Freezing and Disposal of Gametes and Embryos 
The freezing (or cryopreservation) and storing (or "banking") of tissues provide 
new opportunities for the timing and location of assisted reproduction, as well as 
the testing and screening of ex utero sperm, ova, and embryos for donation. Do-
nated sperm, ova, and embryos may now be screened for HIV and other sexu-
ally transmitted diseases, as well as various genetic factors. As we have 
previously discussed, a physician's duty of care as a medical professional now 
requires reasonable efforts to test and screen donation, whether known or 
anonymous.' This duty has now been specifically detailed and embodied in the 
regulations of the Food and Drugs Act dealing with the processing and distribu-
tion of semen.246  The storage of gametes also raises a number of ethical issues, 
including those of confidentiality, privacy, duration and criteria for storage, use 
of data, consent and withdrawal of the subject, and maintaining future contact 
with the subject and her or his family.247 
In light of the sensitivity of the subject matter - potential forms of human 
life and uniquely identifying information - governments may impose limits on 
the condition and quantity of gametes and embryos stored and transferred be-
tween individuals and institutions. In Canada, the federal government now 
regulates the processing and distribution of semen for assisted conception.248 As 
we previously discussed in the section "Existing Legislation," these regulations 
require the processors and importers to quarantine, screen, and test donor se- 
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men. Moreover, at common law, storage facilities may have a duty of care to 
screen and test frozen gametes and embryos for illnesses and genetic condi-
tions.249  However, governmental regulation of the storage and handling facilities 
for gametes and embryos could also lead to increased use of unlicensed artificial 
insemination and higher risks due to the absence of donor screening for illnesses 
and genetic disease.240  In other words, a regulatory regime that too strictly con-
trols the storage and transfer of gametes and embryos could lead to an under-
ground market for reproductive services and "materials." 
The few common law cases so far decided indicate the importance of the do-
nor parties' intentions prior to the freezing and storage of gametes and em-
bryos.251  The parties should also express their intentions with respect to such 
dispositional contingencies as the donors' death or abandonment of donation. As 
previously discussed, human tissue gift legislation, if generally applicable, 
might also apply to frozen gametes and embryos in storage. If so, this would 
suggest that storage banks might have a dispositional authority (over "trans-
plantation") based on possession, if no other family member or relative can be 
found, and there is no reason to believe that the deceased person would have 
objected. 
The abandonment of sperm, ova or embryo donations creates new issues of 
control and disposition. Storage facilities may assert control over abandoned 
gametes and embryos on the sole basis of possession. Also, those parties who 
assisted in the extraction of such reproductive materials and products might at-
tempt to gain dispositional control over them. The situation may also be similar 
where the donors of gametes and embryos die, without any expressed intentions 
or specific instructions for donation. The freezing of sperm and ova can there-
fore lead to complex issues of dispositional authority. Moreover, the disposal of 
gametes and embryos should occur by means that account for their status as 
potential (or early) forms of human life. 
The commercialization of freezing processes and storage facilities for gam-
etes and embryos raises serious concerns. The Final Report of the Royal Com-
mission recommended: "No profit should be made from the selling of any 
reproductive material, including sperm, because of ultimately de-humanizing 
effects. Current commercial practices in storage and distribution of donor sperm 
contravene these values, and we recommend a licensed, non-profit system. ,152 
The Royal Commission warns against the commercialization of human repro-
duction and the commodification of gametes and embryos. 
The maximum storage period for frozen embryos has been variously debated. 
The Royal Commission suggested that it would be unethical to store beyond five 
years or after the death of either partner.253  One might also argue that time limits 
249 See ter Neuzen v. Korn, supra, note 245. 
250 However, see the regulations of the Food and Drugs Act, supra, note 239, which became 
enforceable June 1, 1996 (federal government controls the processing, testing and distribution 
of semen for donor insemination). 
251 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d (Tenn. 1992). 
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253 
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be applied to the storage of sperm and ova. Moreover, the personnel for such 
storage banks should be qualified in the handling, processing and distributing of 
such sensitive "materials." 
In response to the above concerns, the draft AHRA, if enacted, would regu-
late the transfer and storage of gametes and embryos. Section 8(3) of the draft 
Act states: "No person shall, except under the authority of a licence issued under 
subsection 12(1), collect, store, transfer, destroy, import into Canada or export 
from Canada any sperm, ovum or in vitro embryo" for purposes of human re-
production, research or the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of disease, injury, 
or disability. Individuals and facilities may be issued a licence to conduct such 
controlled activities .24  This licensing regime may also ensure that qualified per-
sonnel are employed and that facilities are properly maintained and managed. A 
licensee must also disclose any health reporting information, except information 
that would identify the participants, "to any individual or organization for sci-
entific research or statistical purposes."255  Moreover, where inspectors believe 
on reasonable grounds that a controlled activity has occurred in a premise, other 
than a dwelling house, they may enter the premises for purposes of enforcement 
of the Act. 156 
E. EMBRYO RESEARCH 
Ovarian stimulation and ovum retrieval usually lead to the generation of a 
number of embryos, one or some of which are selected and implanted into a 
woman. It has been generally recognized that the treatment of "spare" embryos 
is an important matter of human dignity and integrity.257  As previously dis-
cussed, embryos, as potential human life, have moral status somewhere in be-
tween property and full personhood, and should be treated with respect. Some 
argue that ova should not be fertilized for the sole purposes of embryo research, 
except in unusual circumstances as determined by a regulatory body where 
knowledge cannot be attained by other means, and where such research would 
benefit society as well as future children.258  Others argue that the fertilization of 
ova for research should be permitted since it may advance scientific knowledge 
and benefit society.259  The draft AHRA would prohibit the creation of in vitro 
embryos solely for research purposes.250 
A primary issue of public concern is the age limit of embryos subject to re-
search, in light of the initial development of nervous systems and possible hu- 
254 
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man suffering. It has been recommended that any research be limited to em-
bryos not older than 14 days from conception - which is also the stage at 
which implantation no longer becomes medically viable.261 In light of the moral 
status of embryos and the potential risks to society, research on embryos may 
require careful regulation and monitoring. The draft AHRA would recognize the 
14th day threshold (from the point of "fertilization or creation") by prohibiting 
the maintenance of an embryo beyond this point "outside the body of a 
woman. ,262 
Most provincial statutes expressly regulate the use of human tissue for re-
search. One could argue that embryos should be included in definitions of hu-
man tissue and are therefore subject to statutory protections regarding consent to 
remove for purposes of research.263 However, since most of these regulatory 
frameworks do not explicitly mention "embryos" in the definition of human 
tissue, embryo research is not necessarily excluded.264  Section 1 of the Trillium 
Gift of Life Network Act of Ontario, on the other hand, expressly excludes em-
bryos from the definition of human tissue, removing any opportunity for a broad 
interpretation by the courts.265 In Ontario, the statutory protection of consent by 
an authorized person, according to a hierarchical list of family members, does 
not apply to embryos for purposes of medical education and research. 
The commercialization of embryo research has also been generally recog-
nized as immoral. Article 25 of the Civil Code of Quebec states that "a]n  ex-
periment may not give rise to any financial reward other than the payment of an 
indemnity as compensation for the loss and inconvenience suffered." Some 
commentators support the allowance of "out-of-pocket" expenses and non-profit 
costs for storage, handling, transportation and transfer.266 The selling and buy-
ing of sperm, ova, and embryos has been widely condemned in Canada and 
abroad. The draft AHRA would impose criminal sanctions for the sale, pur-
chase, barter or exchange of gametes and embryos, whether for research or 
other purposes.267 Section 10 of the draft Act, however, would also allow a 
regulatory system where licensees could request reimbursement for expenses to 
donors, thus ensuring minimum supplies for embryo research. Existing and pro-
posed statutory law for gamete and embryo donation vaguely define important 
terms such as "expenses," "compensation" and "losses." 
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process of differentiation provides researchers with information about the effec-
tiveness of cell replacement therapies to treat genetic and other diseases. An 
abundant supply of stem cells would provide researchers with a foundation for 
research on stem cell therapy as a potential treatment for serious conditions, 
such as Alzheimer's and Parkinson's disease, diabetes, heart disease, and spinal 
cord injuries.275 Stem cell research may lead to the repair of damaged tissues and 
organs, and perhaps someday even to the creation of replacement organs. 
Embryonic stem cells may be obtained from aborted fetuses, or embryos cre-
ated from: gametes combined specifically for research purposes; in vitro fertili-
zation and no longer required for infertility treatment; or somatic cell nuclear 
transfer. Somatic cell nuclear transfer involves extracting the nucleus of an egg 
and replacing it with the nucleus from a somatic cell (cells not from a sperm or 
egg) in order to create an embryo.276 
The decision to use a particular source of embryonic stem cells depends on 
the moral status accorded to embryos. Some argue in favour of using "spare" 
embryos only (i.e., those created but not required for infertility treatment). Ar-
guably, this approach accords a special status to embryos as potential human 
life. At the other end of the spectrum, some argue in favour of the creation of 
embryos for purposes of research, so long as the embryo is not allowed to de-
velop beyond 14 days. According to this view, the embryo is considered more 
like the property of gamete donors and researchers. Other commentators would 
prohibit only somatic cell nuclear transfer. In addition to the issue of the source 
of stem cells, stem cell research raises other issues: informed consent, privacy 
and confidentiality, and the commercialization of research .277 
Until recently, harvesting stem cells has required either the destruction of 
early human embryos or cell extraction from aborted fetuses, thus research on 
embryonic stem cells raises several ethical issues.278 However, it may now be 
possible to use umbilical cords, at least for purposes of organ transplant and 
future insurance against disease.279 Furthermore, adult stem cells appear to show 
275 Canadian Institutes of Health Research, "Human Stem Cell Research: Opportunities for Health and 
Ethical Perspectives" online: <http://www.cihr.calgoveming_council/ad_hoc_working_groups/ 
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Various concerns have also been raised over women and men being unknowing 
experimental subjects. As discussed previously in the section on informed consent 
in this chapter, donors must provide informed consent specific to the purposes of 
research on gametes and embryos. Consent for embryo donation for research pur-
poses should be clearly expressed and in written form.268 Informed consent may 
require that donors be aware of specific research uses, as well as a range of op-
tions, including gestational use, donation to other women, 'or disposal.269 It has 
been recommended that "a very high level of disclosure" be required, including 
success rates and the range of possible negative outcomes where known.  211  In 
cases of pre-implantation of an embryo in a woman's body, for example, informed 
consent requires her awareness of the "experimental, innovative or unproven" na-
ture of techniques, such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis.271 The draft AHRA 
would emphasize the requirement of informed consent for specific purposes as an 
important pillar for the use of reproductive technologies, and for the donation of 
gametes and embryos for research. Section 6(3) would prohibit any use of in vitro 
embryos for purposes of research, unless written consent from the donor is ob-
tained. Any research or medical use of embryos must be licensed under the draft 
Act.272  Medical scientists, on the other hand, often argue that strict standards for 
consent, combined with a regime of prohibitions, may "chill" research that could 
otherwise benefit society. It seems that Canadian society, through dialogue and 
debate, may consider the effects on embryo research specifically, and biotechnol-
ogy generally, in light of their social implications. 
F. STEM CELL RESEARCH 
The advent of stem cell research and its possible regulation has brought wide-
spread media attention.273  Researchers value stem cells highly, especially those 
from embryos, since stem cells are much more adaptive and potent than other 
cells: they are capable of reproducing themselves through self-renewal. Embry-
onic stem cells at the earliest stages of union between a sperm and egg can mul-
tiply and develop (or differentiate) into all other types of cells and tissues.274 The 
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some promise, especially the multipotent stem cells found in nerves, skin, and 
muscle.250 At this point, however, adult stem cells have not shown as much 
promise as those from early embryos. 
The 1998 Tr-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research In-
volving Humans establishes professional guidelines for the federal funding of 
experimental research on human embryos. Research using aborted fetuses and 
embryos not required for infertility treatment may be ethically acceptable if spe-
cific conditions are met. The Tr-Council Policy Statement, however, prohibits 
the creation of embryos for research purposes, the development of embryos in 
vitro beyond 14 days, the cloning of embryos by somatic cell nuclear transfer, 
the creation of animal-human hybrids, and the transfer of embryos between hu-
mans and animals.281  
The Canadian Institutes of Health Research ("CIHR") recommends prohibit-
ing the creation of human embryos by in vitro fertilization for purposes of de-
riving stem cell lines, as well as the use of animal-human combinations of stem 
cells. Furthermore, the CIHR supports a moratorium on funding for the creation 
of embryos by somatic cell nuclear transfer for purposes of deriving stem cell 
lines, as well as research that uses stem cells to create human embryos. How-
ever, because of the importance of stem cells to medical research, the CIHR 
recommends that research on stem cells from "spare" embryos that remain after 
infertility treatments should be allowed and open to funding. The CIHR sup-
ports funding research on existing human embryonic cells and on aborted fe-
tuses, for therapeutic purposes. The CIHR also recommends the establishment 
of a national body to periodically review public and private funding of research 
on stem cells .282  Mechanisms of accountability to the public in a particular re-
gion, an appropriate range of expertise, and the impact of the framework on 
privately funded research, have been identified as problematic areas for this 
national body. 
Stem cell research is not expressly regulated in Canada. Instead, stem cell re-
search falls under professional guidelines and may fall directly or indirectly un-
der several legislative frameworks. As previously discussed, human tissue 
legislation in some provinces may apply to the use of gametes and embryos for 
research purposes. Moreover, patent law might also limit researchers' access to 
specific human embryonic cell lines, assuming that patents for human cell lines 
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are legally valid.283 Other nations have not provided much guidance, since stem 
cell research is relatively new worldwide and proposals for legislative frame-
works are only now appearing.284 Great Britain currently allows the creation of 
embryos by fertilization or cloning for purposes of stem cell research, so long as 
the embryos are not developed beyond 14 days from their fertilization or crea-
tion.285 The United States Government, on the other hand, is now trying to limit 
federal funding only to stem cell research on embryos that already exist for pur-
poses of infertility treatment .211 
In 1995, the federal government requested a voluntary moratorium on vari-
ous embryo-related research activities, including the cloning of human embryos, 
the buying and selling of embryos, germ line genetic alterations, the creation of 
animal-human hybrids, and research involving the maturation of sperm, eggs, 
and embryos outside the human body. This voluntary moratorium apparently 
continues until legislation is put in place. Although we have previously dis-
cussed Bill C-47 and the latest draft AHRA, a few provisions are especially 
relevant to stem cell research. Under the draft AHRA, "embryo" is defined 
broadly to include a "human during the first 56 days of its development follow-
ing fertilization or creation." The draft Act prohibits the creation of embryos for 
the purpose of research. It also expressly prohibits human clones, defined as 
embryos with exactly the same DNA sequence as other human beings, fetuses, 
or embryos. Embryos also cannot be genetically altered in a way that transmits 
across generations, nor can they be maintained outside the human body for more 
than 14 days. 
The effective regulation of stem cell research will draw on social and cultural 
values pertaining to the moral status of the embryo, the requirements of in-
formed consent, respect for privacy and confidentiality, and concern about the 
health and safety of women and children, who are disproportionately impacted 
by such research. 
G. HUMAN CLONING 
This section will briefly address the ethical, social, and legal concerns about 
human cloning, particularly the reproductive cloning of embryos. 
The term "cloning" means different things to different people. At the most basic 
level, cloning involves the making of identical copies of molecules, cells, tissues, 
or even entire organisms.257 The two basic types of cloning are reproductive and 
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therapeutic. Somatic cell nuclear transfer is one kind of reproductive cloning in 
which the DNA of an egg cell is removed and replaced with the DNA from a 
somatic cell. This method of cloning has been identified as a possible treatment 
option for infertile individuals who wish to become parents. Embryonic splitting 
(also called blastomere separation) is another kind of reproductive cloning. In 
this technique, cells from a blastocyst (a clump of early cells that usually devel-
ops into an embryo) are artificially separated so that two or more embryos result 
from the same source. IVF is required for embryonic splitting, followed by im-
plantation into a surrogate mother. Therapeutic cloning, on the other hand, in-
volves the replication of DNA (using stem cells, for example) for therapeutic 
purposes that do not affect subsequent attempts at reproduction. The effort to 
grow human organs for purposes of transplantation is an example of therapeutic 
cloning. 
Because cloning is about replication, not necessarily reproduction, cloning 
includes several widely accepted practices. Cloning encompasses the replication 
of fragments of DNA, and in this sense scientists have been cloning DNA for 
years in order to advance the treatment and understanding of human diseases, 
such as haemophilia, cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia, and emphysema.288 
More controversially, researchers have had recent successes in cloning non-
human mammals by somatic cell nuclear transfer: for example, Dolly the sheep, 
and the genetically identical rhesus monkeys used for AIDS testing. Even more 
recently, there have been reports of the cloning of human embryos.289 Despite 
these developments, cloning technology remains experimental and unproven in 
application to entire mammals, especially human beings. The ability to replicate 
humans would bring at least three novel and controversial developments: re-
placement of sexual reproduction with asexual replication of an existing set of 
genes; the ability to predetermine the genes of a child; and the ability to create 
genetically identical offspring.290 
The very possibility of replicating humans has generated widespread con-
cern.291  According to at least one poll conducted in 2001, most Canadians 
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strongly oppose human cloning.292 In response to the outcries, many people and 
governments have called for an immediate ban on human cloning worldwide.293 
These reactions and calls for outright prohibition raise issues about the lack of 
public access to information, confusion in the definition of "cloning," and the 
fact that law and ethics tend to lag far behind the science of cloning. 
In order to effectively prohibit or regulate cloning, the law requires, at least, a 
working definition. In drafting legislation, the definition of "cloning" must be 
neither so broad that it encompasses many useful activities, nor so narrow that it 
does not effectively capture the cloning practices to be prohibited. A further 
issue emerges from the prohibition of cloning: should the government prohibit 
just the act of cloning, or should the government go further and prohibit cloned 
materials themselves? Currently, cloned materials may be imported into Canada 
from nations that allow cloning. Thus, "forum shopping" for cloning services in 
the United States or elsewhere could undermine Canada's attempts at prohibi-
tion. The patent systems in Canada and other nations may also affect access to 
(and use of) cloning techniques and cloned materials.294 Because cloning in-
volves a variety of procedures and purposes, a variety of positions can be taken 
with respect to it. Arguably, replicating humans could have significant benefits. 
Medical science might benefit greatly from the comparison of treatments on 
genetically identical embryos in their development (even if research were 
stopped after 14 days). Some claim that the cloning of entire human beings 
should be allowed as an aspect of scientific freedom and reproductive auton-
omy. Others argue that, while the cloning of entire humans should not be al-
lowed, the cloning of DNA, genes, cells, and body parts is vital for the 
advancement of medical research in the search for new treatments and testing 
for disease. The federal government has suggested that it may allow the cloning 
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of human embryos for the therapeutic purposes of medical research and organ 
reproduction only, as is permitted in Great Britain.295 
There are no reported cases in Canada on the issue of cloning, and only lim-
ited legislation enacted worldwide. The Government of Canada, moreover, has 
limited guidance from international law. Article 11 of the Universal Declaration 
on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 1997 states: "Practices which are 
contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive cloning of human beings, shall 
not be permitted."296 Until new legislation in Canada is put into place, the laws 
governing family relationships (paternity, egg donation, surrogacy) would apply 
to embryos produced by cloning procedures  .297  Researchers who receive federal 
funding must also adhere to the Tr-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct 
for Research Involving Humans, which prohibits human cloning by any means, 
including somatic cell nuclear transfer.298 
The draft AHRA, if enacted, would explicitly prohibit all forms of reproduc-
tive cloning: s. 3 prohibits a person from knowingly creating a human clone or 
transplant, or participating in the transplantation of a human clone into a human 
being. Section 2 the draft Act defines "human clone" as an "embryo that as a 
result of the manipulation of human reproductive material contains the same 
nuclear deoxyribonucleic acid sequence as is found in the cell of a living or de-
ceased human being, foetus, or embryo." "Human reproductive material" is de-
fined broadly in s. 2 to include: "a sperm, ovum, other human cell, human gene 
or in vitro embryo, and includes a part of any of them." Furthermore, the draft 
Act defines "embryo" in terms of "fertilization or creation." The language of 
"creation" also suggests prohibition of cloned embryos created using somatic 
cell nuclear transfer.299 The draft AHRA also would prohibit the alteration of the 
"genome of a cell of a human being or in vitro embryo such that the alteration is 
capable of being transmitted to its descendants."30° Embryonic splitting for re-
productive purposes is also prohibited under s. 3(1)(e). Moreover, an embryo 
cannot be sustained in vitro beyond 14 days from fertilization or creation.301 The 
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prohibitions above apply broadly to anyone who participates in the creation of 
human clones. 
Cloning is defended by appeal to the intrinsic and instrumental value of free 
scientific inquiry, and by appeal to personal reproductive autonomy. Many de-
fenders of cloning argue that people are more than just the "sum of their genes": 
social, cultural and environmental factors combine with our genetic inheritance 
to make us who we are.302 Cloning would enhance (and not determine) us as 
human beings. 
Opponents of cloning argue that it is inherently wrong as it desensitizes us to 
human life, potentially turning embryos into "human organ manufacturing 
plant[s]."303  Furthermore, it is argued, cloning may lead to the loss of individu-
ality and personhood since not one but two or more clones will exist, even if 
only at the cellular level. For some, an ethical response to cloning depends on an 
answer to the familiar "property or person?" question. There is no consensus on 
that issue: some consider clones to be the property of the donor, and even sub-
ject to com.modification, while others argue for personhood. The clone, if devel-
oped to the level of an entire being, might face social stigmatization and become 
a member of a new "genetic underclass,"304 possibly labeled under a new family 
category - neither a daughter/son, nor a delayed sister/brother of the genetic 
contributor. Privacy is another serious concern, since embryos contain cells with 
genetically unique information, and clones would be identifiable as genetically 
identical. 
There are practical problems with cloning, as well. Cloning is still an ex-
perimental procedure, so we must seriously consider the risks of genetic defects 
and potential harm to future children. Similarly, there are significant risks to 
gestational mothers, risks downplayed or silenced by academic and media re-
ports. 
In light of these different positions, one must find a balance between respect 
for the special status of the embryo and the interests of the people who suffer 
from disease, gestational mothers, as well as the interests of future children who 
may benefit or be harmed as a result. Harm can be defined not just in terms of 
the cloned individual, in part or whole, but also in terms of the societal value of 
what it means to be human. The use of cloning at all levels, it is argued, would 
lessen genetic diversity and therefore harm humankind as a whole in its evolu-
tion. 
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Reproductive technologies raise a myriad of legal, ethical and social issues with 
which society must contend. These include questions about who should have 
access to RTs, whether women should be inseminated with the sperm of men 
who are now deceased, whether gamete or embryo donors may revoke their 
consent, and how to control the creation or manipulation of embryos for repro-
duction or research. Finding answers to these issues is difficult, in part, because 
there is no social consensus concerning which acts and practices should be per-
missible. As we have suggested in this chapter, while some of the legal ques-
tions generated by reproductive technologies might be adequately resolved by 
applying existing common law principles and statutes, many feel that a direct 
legislative response is needed. Legislative intervention would ensure respect for 
the fundamental values of Canadian society, protect the public against risks to 
health and safety, and provide clear principles of law according to which poten-
tial disputes could be resolved. 
Designing such a legislative response is a difficult enterprise. We need to as-
sess the effectiveness of different types of law to answer problems raised by 
RTs. For example, the use of criminal prohibitions rather than more flexible 
regulatory regimes needs to be considered. In addition, there may be a danger in 
assuming that new laws enacted by Parliament or legislatures can adequately 
address all of the problems raised by RTs. It has been argued that the challenge 
posed by RTs "is to harness the law so as to mediate between moral imperatives 
and the therapeutic or non-therapeutic benefits of the advancement of sci-
ence."305  How can we fashion a regulatory regime "which incorporate[s] a re-
view of the ethical and social consequences of a technology""' and also ensures 
safety and efficacy? Canadian federalism further complicates the possibility of a 
national and uniform approach to the regulation of reproductive technologies. In 
the absence of a legislated regulatory framework, the development of case law 
may be susceptible to differing interpretations and policy preferences in the dif-
ferent jurisdictions. Here, the traditional role of the federal government in regu-
lating medical technology overlaps with the exclusive provincial role in the 
provision of medical services. 
The commodification of gametes and embryos and the commercialization of 
human reproduction raise pressing concerns that cannot be left to market forces 
and an order of private law. Any regulatory regime must flexibly account for the 
social and biological dimensions of reproductive technologies, in light of the 
Canadian Constitution and evolving societal norms. At the same time, medical 
research and technological developments should not be overly constrained or 
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"chilled" because of regulation. The Canadian situation will likely be affected 
by developments outside Canada's borders, including the emergence of case law 
and regulatory regimes, such as the United Kingdom's Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act, 1990. Conflicting and inconsistent precedents from both Cana-
dian and other common law jurisdictions are likely to leave a de facto situation 
of market regulation with private ordering as the default. Moreover, given the 
central role played by medical practitioners in offering and providing reproduc-
tive technologies, any form of piecemeal private ordering is likely to leave in 
place the medical model as the dominant model of decision-making. Once pri-
vate ordering and market forces become entrenched, it may be very difficult to 
put in place an alternative statutory regime and a distinctive form of administra-
tive regulation. 
The Royal Commission and other commissions and panels have raised con-
cerns about reproductive technologies. If reproductive technologies are defined 
as a response to a condition called "infertility," then it should be recognized that 
infertility, in that sense, is as much a social condition as a medical problem. Re-
productive technologies are, among other things, a means to avoid passing on 
genetic and other hereditary diseases to offspring, and a means for women to 
reproduce without the assistance of male partners. 
The draft AHRA, which will soon face debate and revision, provides an ini-
tial basis from which legislators might attempt to co-ordinate a comprehensive 
regulatory regime that respects the profound social consequences of reproduc-
tive technologies. Any such regime should carefully account for the responsible 
gatekeeping of new forms of family and the effects on personal and social lives. 
It remains to be seen whether a distinctive Canadian regulatory regime will be 
fashioned in this area. 
